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Planning Past Pensions 
Julie Roin* 
Evidence of state and local government dysfunction surfaces in many 
areas.  One is the operation of employee pension plans.  Free from the 
strictures of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 
some state governments failed to adequately fund their pension 
promises.  With the imminent retirement of the baby boom generation, 
these states are facing what appear to be insurmountable pension debts. 
Illinois is one of the worst hit states, with grossly underfunded 
pension plans, a state constitutional prohibition on reducing pension 
benefits, and a sizable non-pension-related budget deficit.  Illinois 
courts will likely strike down recently passed pension “reforms.”  There 
are no easy solutions to its pension woes, but this Article seeks to lay 
out a few steps that Illinois and other states can take now, under current 
law.  This Article also suggests more long-term policy and legal 
changes that Illinois should consider for the future. 
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In 1974, Congress made a calculated decision to exclude 
governmental plans from the strictures1 of its landmark pension 
legislation, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).2  
Governments, unlike private employers, were neither required to fund 
their pension promises during their employees’ working careers, nor to 
pay into the federal insurance program that protected private sector 
employees against their employers’ bankruptcies.3  Congress decided 
that public employees did not need these pension protections because 
governments could always raise the additional revenue necessary to 
fund their pension promises.4 
Not only were governments excused from the funding obligations 
attached to private plans, but they also were largely excused from 
divulging information about the financing—or lack thereof—of their 
pension plans.5  That is, unless provided otherwise under state law, 
 
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2012) (“The 
provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any employee benefit plan if—(1) such plan is a 
governmental plan (as defined in section 1002(32) of this title) . . . .”).  Section 3(32) of the Act 
defines the term “governmental plan” as “a plan established or maintained for its employees by 
the Government of the United States, by the government of any State or political subdivision 
thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing.”  Id. § 3(32).  Governmental 
plans have been specifically exempted from adherence to the minimum participation standards, 
I.R.C. § 410(c)(1)(A) (2012), the vesting standards, id. § 411(e)(1)(A), and the minimum funding 
standards, id. § 412(e)(2)(C). 
2. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 is the official designation of the 
Pension Reform Act of 1974, now codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461. 
3. Melanie Walker & Cathie Eitelberg, Regulation of Public-Sector Retirement Plans, in 
FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 428–29 n.5 (6th ed. 2009), available at 
www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/fundamentals/2009/43_RegCost_PUB-SCT_Funds-2009_E 
BRI.pdf (“Government plans are exempt from most of ERISA’s reporting, disclosure, and 
funding requirements (Title I) and plan termination insurance (Title IV).”).  Of course, not all 
governmental employers can declare bankruptcy.  See infra note 67 and accompanying text 
(discussing the history and potential of governmental bodies and states to declare bankruptcy). 
4. See Jack VanDerhei, Funding Public and Private Pensions, in PENSION FUNDING & 
TAXATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR TOMORROW 59, 75 (Dallas L. Salisbury & Nora Super Jones eds., 
1994) (“The legislature considered the ability of the governmental entities to fulfill the obligation 
to employees through their taxing powers an adequate substitute for minimum funding 
standards.”).  The decision to exclude public plans from ERISA’s coverage was controversial.  
See Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 9 n.13 (2013) 
(citing sources from the 1970s warning about the underfunding of public pensions). 
5. See Fiona E. Liston & Adrien R. LaBombarde, Changing Public Pension Funding Rules, in 
PENSION FUNDING & TAXATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR TOMORROW, supra note 4, at 127 (“Even 
the accounting rules for reporting the funded status to creditors and others are not as strict.”); 
Walker & Eitelberg, supra note 3 (noting that government plans were not required to comply with 
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subnational governments were not required to disclose either the 
actuarial value of their accrued pension liabilities or how those accruals 
matched—or did not match—the amounts that had been set aside to pay 
for them.6  Instead, while required to reflect the difference between their 
“annual required contributions” and their actual contributions to the 
plan as liabilities on their balance sheets,7 the applicable accounting 
rules often allowed governments to manipulate actuarial assumptions in 
such a way as to reduce those annual required contribution amounts to 
unreasonably low levels to avoid showing any liability at all.8 
 
ERISA’s reporting and disclosing provisions).  Accounting standards for state and local 
governments are set by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”), an 
independent, not-for-profit organization formed in 1984 for that purpose.  Although the 
organization does not have enforcement authority, some states require their governmental entities 
to follow GASB standards for financial reporting purposes, and auditors rely on those standards 
when “render[ing] opinions on the fairness of financial statement presentations in conformity 
with GAAP.”  GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FACTS ABOUT GASB 1 (2013).  
In addition, bond-rating agencies “generally consider whether GASB standards are followed 
when assessing credit standing.”  Alicia H. Munnell et al., How Would GASB Proposals Affect 
State and Local Pension Reporting?, 23 CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT B.C., Nov. 2011, 
at 1–2. 
6. This situation is fast coming to an end.  The GASB adopted new standards for the 
disclosure of pension obligations that apply to financial statements as of December 31, 2014 
(GASB Statement No. 67) and December 31, 2015 (GASB Statement No. 68).  These new 
standards require governments to disclose the difference between their “total pension liability” 
and the fair market value of pension assets.  Further, they require the use of much more realistic 
actuarial assumptions for purposes of calculating the total pension liability figure.  News Release, 
GASB, News Release 06/25/12, GASB Improves Pension Accounting and Financial Reporting 
Standards (June 25, 2012), available at www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?pagename=GASB/ 
GASBContent_C/GASBNewsPage&cid=1176160126951. 
7. See generally GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 25: 
FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS AND NOTE DISCLOSURES FOR 
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS (1994) [hereinafter STATEMENT NO. 25]; GOVERNMENTAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 27: ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS BY STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYERS (1994) [hereinafter STATEMENT NO. 27]. 
8. See Liston & LaBombarde, supra note 5, at 128 (“A report recently issued by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) on the funding practices of state and local governments raises some 
concerns that . . . actuarial assumptions are being manipulated in order to reduce required plan 
contributions . . . .”).  Thus, from an accounting perspective, underfunded plans appeared to be 
fully funded.  See Apostolou et al., Bridging the Government Pension Reporting Gap: The Effects 
of New GASB Standards on Governments Pension Accounting, CPA J., Aug. 2013, at 28, 29 
(discussing how GASB Statement 27 was “roundly criticized for severely understating the 
pension obligations on the balance sheets of public entities by disclosing the amount of unfunded 
pension liability in the notes to their financial statements, rather than recognizing a liability on the 
face of the balance sheet” and for allowing governments to provide a misleading number—”the 
difference between the required contributions to a pension plan in a given year and what was 
actually funded”—as the measurement of liability on the balance sheet); Michael A. Moran, A 
“Sea Change” in Public Pension Reporting on the Horizon, GOLDMAN SACHS ASSET MGMT. 2 
White Paper (Dec. 2012), available at https://assetmanagement.gs.com/content/dam/gsam/ 
pdfs/us/en/advisor-resources/sales-library/retirement/wp-public-pension-sea-change.pdf (“[P]lans 
that fully paid their [annual required contributions] each year showed no liability on their balance 
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Moreover, the rules allowed governments to use a thirty-year period 
for amortizing changes in actuarial assumptions and unfunded 
liabilities, even when associated benefits were to be disbursed over a 
shorter time frame.9  Unfunded pension and pension-related 
obligations10 thus operated as secret debt, largely hidden from 
employees, taxpayers, credit agencies, and bondholders.11  Public and 
political concern about underfunding did not become widespread until 
the Government Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”) adopted an 
accounting standard forcing the disclosure of unfunded, non-pension 
retirement benefits (chiefly medical benefits) in 2004.12  The new 
standard forced states and municipalities with annual revenues of $100 
million or more to disclose the present value of accrued, non-pension 
liabilities and the value of the assets set aside to pay them in 2007; the 
reporting deadline for smaller governments was 2010.13 
As the required reports trickled out, revealing underfunding on a vast 
scale,14 employees, taxpayers, and investors in state and local bonds 
 
sheets even if the plan was underfunded.”). 
9. See Suesan R. Patton et al., GASB Statement No. 68 Brings Needed Pension Transparency, 
AM. INST. CPAS (Jan. 2014), http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/businessindustryandgove 
rnment/newsandpublications/downloadabledocuments/gasb_statement_68_government_brief.pdf 
(praising change in GASB Statement No. 68 which requires “most changes in the net pension 
liability from period to period (changes in estimates) will be charged to expense in full in the next 
period—not amortized, say, over the GASB Statement 27 maximum amortization period of 30 
years”). 
10. Many states promised to provide medical and other benefits to retirees in addition to their 
pensions.  See Joshua Franzel & Alex Brown, Spotlight on Retiree Health Care Benefits for State 
Employees in 2013, (Ctr. for St. & Loc. Gov’t Excellence, Washington, D.C.), June 18, 2013, at 
1, available at http://slge.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/OPEB-Spotlight-06176.pdf (“[T]he 
largest portion of OPEB benefits is retiree health insurance, which most states provide to retired 
employees.”). 
11. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSION 
PLANS: ECONOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS COSTS AND SUSTAINABILITY 7 
(March 2012) [hereinafter GAO, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS] (“In 2008 
and 2010, respectively, the Securities and Exchange Commission took enforcement actions 
against the city of San Diego and the state of New Jersey for misrepresenting the financial 
condition of their pension funds in information provided to investors.”); Michael Corkery, SEC 
Says Illinois Hid Pension Troubles, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2013, at A1 (announcing settlement of 
security fraud charges under which Illinois avoided paying a penalty or admitting wrongdoing). 
12. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 45: ACCOUNTING AND 
FINANCIAL REPORTING BY EMPLOYERS FOR POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN 
PENSIONS (2004) [hereinafter STATEMENT NO. 45]. 
13. Id. 
14. See, e.g., Div. of Local Gov’t & Sch. Accountability, GASB 45: Reporting the True Cost 
of Other Post-Employment Benefits, OFF. N.Y. ST. COMPTROLLER 1 (May 2008), available at 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/opeb_policyreport.pdf (“Preliminary estimates 
indicate that these unfunded OPEB liabilities in the public sector exceed $1.5 trillion 
nationally.”); Cities Squeezed by Pension and Retiree Health Care Shortfalls, PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS 1 (Mar. 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/ 
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became concerned about the underfunding of pension plans as well as 
these other retirement benefit plans.15  This concern, as well as more 
generalized concern about the transparency of the reporting rules, led 
the GASB to initiate a project to reform the rules for reporting pension 
benefits.16  This project resulted in the issuance of new accounting 
standards, which, as of 2014 required governments to disclose the 
difference between the present value of accrued pension benefits and the 
fair market value of the assets set aside to pay them as liabilities on their 
balance sheets.17  Meanwhile, at least in some jurisdictions, the 
shortfalls continue to grow. 
The state of Illinois is in a particularly perilous situation, but it 
provides a reasonably good illustration of the pension problems facing 
many states.  Its unfunded pension debt amounts to $7346 per 
 
Pewcitypensionsbriefpdf.pdf (noting how just thirty cities had a long term shortfall of $104 
billion for retiree health care and other non-pension benefits in 2009). 
15. Concern about such underfunding was not new.  Beermann, supra note 4, at 9 n.13 (listing 
articles about underfunding of public pension plans dating back to 1976).  However, it has 
become more widespread and strident (“all over the news,” id. at 10) in recent years as the 
combination of increased disclosure and the effects of the recession on both pension assets and 
the availability of government funding for pensions made the situation more dire.  Compare U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RETIREE BENEFITS: 
CURRENT FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION AND HEALTH BENEFITS 3 (2008) (“58% of 65 large 
public pension plans were funded to [the 80% or better] level in 2006, a decrease since 2000 
when about 90% of plans were so funded.”), with GAO, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
PENSION PLANS, supra note 11, at 7 (“[M]ost plans have experienced a growing gap between 
actuarial assets and liabilities over the past decade, meaning that higher contributions from 
government sponsors are needed to maintain funds on an actuarially based path toward 
sustainability. . . .  State and local governments experienced declining revenues and growing 
expenses on other fronts, and growing budget pressures will continue to challenge their ability to 
provide adequate contributions to help sustain their pension funds.”). 
16. This project began in 2006 with a research project on the effectiveness of the then-
operative accounting rules.  See GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT 
NO. 68: ACCT. AND FIN. REPORTING FOR PENSIONS 73–74 (2012) [hereinafter STATEMENT NO. 
68] (discussing the GASB’s approval for research of the effectiveness of Statement Nos. 25 and 
27). 
17. GASB Statement 67, effective for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2013, and GASB 
Statement 68, effective for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2014, not only require the use of 
actual, rather than smoothed, asset values for purposes of determining the value of pension trusts, 
but also mandate the use of more realistic actuarial assumptions for determining pension costs, 
from discount rates to the use of the “entry age normal/level percentage of payroll” for 
determining annual liability accrual.  Apostolou et al., supra note 8, at 29.  However, some think 
that the new rules do not go far enough, and may even be counterproductive because they fail to 
require governments to highlight differences between amounts necessary to amortize plans’ 
unfunded liability over a thirty-year period and their sponsors’ actual contributions for the year.  
Cory Eucalitto, GASB’s Ineffective Public Pension Reporting Standards Set to Take Effect, ST. 
BUDGET SOLUTIONS (June 5, 2013), www.statebudgetsolutions.org/publications/detail/gasbs-
ineffective-public-pension-reporting-standards-set-to-take-effect (describing flaws). 
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resident18—and this figure reflects only the pensions due to state 
employees.  Many of its municipalities and other local government units 
have considerable unfunded pension plan liabilities of their own.19  The 
discrepancy between promised benefits and pension trust funds is so 
substantial that some estimates have the state running through those 
trust funds in 2018.20  Future benefits will have to be paid out of general 
state revenues or simply not paid.  If events follow their current course, 
by 2025, it is estimated that pension payments will eat up twenty-two to 
twenty-five percent of state tax revenues.21 
Unfortunately for Illinois residents, current state revenues do not 
cover the state’s current expenses, let alone generate the additional 
funds that will be needed to defray these pension costs.  Despite a fifty 
percent increase in its income tax rate in 2011,22 the state still had a 
$5.4 billion backlog of unpaid “current” bills in 2014.23  Moreover, that 
tax increase was temporary and lapsed at the end of the 2014 fiscal 
year.24  This cascade of fiscal woes has “caused the major credit rating 
agencies to downgrade Illinois to the lowest credit rating of any state.”25 
In response to this crisis, the Illinois state legislature passed a pension 
reform bill at the end of 2013 that the governor’s office estimated will 
save the state about $145 billion over the next three decades, reduce the 
$100 billion of unfunded pension liabilities by about $40 billion, and 
lead to a fully funded pension system by 2044.26  Unfortunately, as 
explained in Part I below, the bill is likely to be held unconstitutional in 
 
18. Shawn P. O’Leary & Kristen DeJong, The True Cost of Illinois’ Pension Reform Failures, 
NUVEEN ASSET MGMT. 2 ex.1 (Oct. 2013). 
19. Id. (noting also that total per capita liability, including both state and local pension debt, of 
Chicago residents amounts to $18,924). 
20. See Josh Rauh, The Day of Reckoning for State Pension Plans, KELLOGG SCH. OF MGMT. 
(Mar. 22, 2010), http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/2010/03/22/the-day-of-reckoning-for-state-
pension-plans/ (noting how pension trust will be exhausted in 2018). 
21. Illinois Needs to Pass Public Pension Reform, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 3 (July 2013), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/Illinois20Needs20Pensi
on20Reformpdf.pdf [hereinafter PEW REPORT]. 
22. Personal income tax rates were raised from 3.75% to 5%, while the corporate rate 
increased from 5.25% to 7%.  Thomas A. Corfman, Civic Federation: Keep Most of Illinois’ 
‘Temporary’ Income Tax Hike, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.chicagob 
usiness.com/article/20140303/NEWS02/140309994/civic-federation-keep-most-of-illinois-tempo 
rary-income-tax-hike (describing tax increases). 
23. Id. 
24. Bob Sector & Rick Pearson, Illinois Income Tax Drop Kicks In, CHI. TRIB., Jan.1, 2015, at 
1.1. 
25. Kerry Lester, Illinois Unions Sue Over Pension Reform Cuts, HUFF. POST (Jan. 29, 2014, 
6:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/29/illinois-unions-pension-reform_n_46866 
27.html. 
26. See id. (describing bill). 
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the lawsuits that have been filed challenging its legality.27  Rather than 
waste more time and compound the existing problems, the Illinois state 
government needs to pursue reforms that are legal and that would 
protect the valid interests of state employees. 
I.  THE LIKELY INVALIDITY OF THE 2013 PENSION REFORMS 
Although Illinois law once treated governmental pensions as mere 
“gratuities” that state and local governments could nullify at will,28 the 
drafters of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 included a provision 
intended to protect government employees against forfeitures.  One of 
the Illinois Constitution’s provisions, commonly known as the Pension 
Protection Clause, specifically provides that: 
Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit 
of local government or school district, or any agency or 
instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual 
 
27. Complaint, Retired State Emps. Assoc. v. Quinn, Topinka, Rutherford & Bd. of Trs. of the 
State Emps. Retirement Sys., No. 2014MR000001 (Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, 
Sangamon Cnty., Ill., filed Jan. 2, 2014) (seeking class action status in lawsuit to declare Public 
Act 98-599 unconstitutional to the extent it “diminishes and impairs the 3% Automatic 
Increase”); Complaint, Ill. State Emps. Ass’n Retirees vs. Bd. of Trs. of the State Emps.’ Ret. 
Sys. of Ill., No. 2014CH000003 (Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon Cnty., 
filed Jan. 2, 2014) (seeking class certification and declaratory judgment that alterations in three 
percent automatic increase invalid); Complaint, Heaton, Keller, Lee v. Quinn, Topinka & the Bd. 
of Trs. of the Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of the State Of Ill., No. 2013CH28406 (Circuit Court of Cook 
Cnty., filed Dec. 27, 2013) (seeking class certification and challenging alterations in automatic 
increases, increases in retirement age, and cap on salary used in pension calculation).  These cases 
have been consolidated in Sangamon County, the county within which the state capital, 
Springfield, is located.  Doug Finke, Illinois Pension Reform Lawsuits to be Merged, PEORIA J. 
STAR (Mar. 3, 2014, 9:34 PM), http://www.pjstar.com/article/20140303/News/140309759.  The 
Circuit Court imposed a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing the 
new law from taking effect on June 1, 2014.  Ray Long, Court Puts Pension Law on Hold, CHI. 
TRIB., May 15, 2014, at 1.10.  That same Circuit Court judge struck down the Illinois pension 
reform act on November 21, 2014, agreeing with public employee unions and retirees that the law 
“‘without a question’ violates the state constitution’s provision that a public worker pension 
cannot be ‘diminished or impaired.’”  Ray Long & Hal Dardick, Judge KO’s Pension Law, 
Illinois to Appeal Ruling that Reductions in Retiree Benefit are Unconstitutional, CHI. TRIB., 
Nov. 22, 2014, at 1.1.  The judge “brushed aside” the State’s argument that “modifications in 
pension plans could be made in extraordinary circumstances,” concluding that “‘The pension 
protection clause contains no exceptions, restrictions or limitations for an exercise of the state’s 
police powers or sovereign powers.’”  See id. (quoting Sangamon County Circuit Judge John 
Belz).  The Illinois Attorney General immediately announced that she would file an expedited 
appeal to the state supreme court.  See id.  The request for an expedited hearing was granted, 
Monique Garcia, State’s Top Court to Hear Pension Case in March, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 2014, at 
1.7, and the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case on March 11, 2015. Rick Pearson, 
Monique Garcia & Bob Secter, Illinois Supreme Court Grills State’s Solicitor General on 
Constitutionality, CHI. TRIB., March 12, 2015, at 1.1. 
28. See, e.g., Bergin v. Bd. of Trs. of the Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 202 N.E.2d 489 (Ill. 1964). 
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relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or 
impaired.29 
The language of the Pension Protection Clause could be interpreted in 
several different ways.  One possible interpretation would accord with 
the non-impairment rules established under ERISA for the termination 
and/or modification of private pension plans.  This interpretation would 
forbid the state from reducing accrued pension benefits, while allowing 
it to reduce benefits earned through the future performance of services.  
Another possible interpretation, which is supported by prior decisions of 
the Illinois courts, does not allow the state to diminish either past 
accruals or the rate of future pension accruals by current state 
employees.30  The pension reforms that Illinois enacted in 2013 meet 
neither of these standards. 
A.  Protecting Past Accruals: The Federal Analogy 
Private employers are not, and never have been, required to provide 
pension plans for their employees.31  Federal law provides employers 
with tax advantages for maintaining plans meeting certain 
requirements,32 but those requirements do not mandate that plans, once 
established, have to be continued ad infinitum.  Indeed, Congress 
predicted that some plans would be terminated, and ERISA spells out 
the consequences of such terminations—and modifications—in 
substantial detail.33 
These rules protect employees against clawbacks of benefits earned 
through services provided prior to the date of a plan’s termination34 or 
 
29. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5. 
30. Employees hired after the date of enactment of pension-reducing statutes, however, would 
accrue pension benefits in accordance with those new rules. 
31. See PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 18 (2010) 
(“ERISA does not infringe on employers’ freedom to choose whether to sponsor employee 
benefit programs.”). 
32. These plans allow employers to provide their employees with tax-advantaged 
compensation.  Employees neither pay tax on amounts contributed on their behalf nor on any 
earnings generated through the investment of those amounts until those amounts are distributed to 
them following their retirement.  Employees thus defer payment of taxes, generating time-value-
of-money gains, and often end up paying the tax dues on these amounts in years in which they 
face relatively low marginal tax rates.  See JEFFREY G. SHERMAN, PENSION PLANNING AND 
DEFERRED COMPENSATION 103 (2d ed. 1990) (quantifying the benefit). 
33. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 4041–4048, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1341–1348 (2012). 
34. See I.R.C. § 411(d)(3) (2012) (requiring qualified plans to provide that in the case of 
termination or partial termination “the rights of all affected employees to benefits accrued to the 
date of such termination, partial termination, or discontinuance, to the extent funded as of such 
date, or the amounts credited to the employees’ accounts, are nonforfeitable”). 
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modification,35 but allow employers unfettered freedom to modify the 
terms under which additional benefits can be earned through the future 
performance of services.36  Employers have as much freedom to modify 
the terms of their pension programs going forward as they do wage 
rates.  As a practical matter, this means that when federal rules apply, 
employees covered by defined benefit plans similar to those maintained 
by the state of Illinois and its agencies are entitled to retirement benefits 
equal in value to the present value of any benefits earned through 
service performed as of the date of the plan’s termination37 or 
amendment.38  This protection applies to unvested and vested benefits, 
as federal statutes provide that the act of amendment or termination 
vests any unvested benefits provisionally earned as of that date.39 
Employers have some flexibility regarding the form in which the 
protected benefits can be provided to covered employees.  Depending 
on the circumstances, these accumulated benefits may be distributed in 
the form of lump-sum payments equal to the actuarial value of the 
accrued benefit.40  Alternatively, the employer can provide an annuity 
policy with that actuarial value from a third party provider such as an 
insurance company.41  Finally, the actuarial value of such benefits may 
be the employee’s opening balance in a cash-balance pension plan 
established by the employer as a follow-on plan to the original plan.42  
No matter the form though, each employee is entitled to receive the 
 
35. Id. § 411(d)(6) (disqualifying any plan “if the accrued benefit of a participant is decreased 
by an amendment of the plan”); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-3 (2009). 
36. Smith v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 36 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that plan modifications are effective after “the amendment has been appropriately adopted in a 
formal, complete and written form”); Prod. & Maint. Emps.’ Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 954 
F.2d 1397, 1404 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that plan continues in force until “properly amended”); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (2)(a) (1988). 
37. See WIEDENBECK, supra note 31, at 278–79 (describing “standard” termination of a plan 
with assets equal to accrued liabilities).  Benefits owed to employees under terminated, under-
funded plans are guaranteed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”), a 
government corporation funded by mandatory insurance premiums levied on plan sponsors, up to 
certain statutory maximums.  See id. at 270–71 (describing PBGC’s guaranty). 
38. E.g., id. at 220–22 (describing the “accrued benefit anti-cutback” rule). 
39. See id. at 221 (“Retroactive reductions in accrued benefits would often violate ERISA’s 
vesting rules, but the accrued benefit anti-cutback rule is broader, as it protects even nonvested 
participants from pension cutbacks.”). 
40. See id. at 279 (option available if present value of benefit is under $5000). 
41. Id. (“The plan administrator provides for most participants and beneficiaries by purchasing 
irrevocable commitments from an insurance company to pay all promised benefits.”). 
42. Technically, this option does not count as a termination of the original plan, and the rules 
for the conversion from a traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan are provided by 
another statute.  See id. at 218 (“[T]he Pension Protection Act of 2006 amended ERISA to . . . 
grant a safe harbor for conversions of traditional defined benefit plans into cash balance plans.”). 
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actuarial value of the benefits he or she had earned prior to the change 
in the plan.43 
Illinois pension plans44 are not subject to these termination rules any 
more than they are to the funding rules.  Instead, as is described in the 
next Subpart,45 they appear to be covered by even more restrictive 
limitations on termination or modification imposed by the state 
constitution.  However, it is worth noting that the pension reforms that 
Illinois enacted in 2013 fail to meet even these federal standards 
because they take back some benefits earned through the performance 
of services prior to the effective date of the legislative pension plan 
changes.46  Thus, for Supreme Court of Illinois to uphold these reforms, 
 
43. Moreover, that benefit must be determined in accordance with the pre-amendment 
actuarial assumptions.  I.R.C. § 430(h)(5) (2012); Rev. Rul. 81-12, 1981-1 C.B. 228; 
WIEDENBECK, supra note 31, at 222 n.45 (“The alteration of a defined benefit plan’s method of 
determining actuarial equivalence, such as changing the plan’s interest rate assumption, can have 
a dramatic impact on the amounts payable under different timing options, so retroactive changes 
in actuarial assumptions have long been understood to be impermissible.”). 
44. The state of Illinois maintains several different defined benefit pension plans, and the 
pension reform bill separately amends each such plan.  As these amendments amend each of these 
plans in identical, or almost identical, ways, in the interest of readability, this Article is written as 
if only one such plan exists, and cites to the legislative language applicable to just one plan. 
45. See infra Part I.B (discussing Illinois pension plans and their various complexities and 
restrictions). 
46. Although ERISA, by its terms, would not apply, some have suggested that the retraction 
of previously accrued pension benefits could violate either the Takings Clause, see U.S. CONST. 
amend. V, or the Contracts Clause, see U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.  It is clear that the state 
cannot take back money that it previously paid for the performance of services without running 
afoul of the Takings Clause.  Why should a governmental promise to pay money for services that 
had been performed be deserving of less protection in a world in which “government contractual 
promises may be considered property for constitutional purposes”?  Beermann, supra note 4, at 
63.  Doctrinally, what seems to matter is the legal strength of the underlying promise: Is it one 
that is considered sufficiently “property-like” to be recognized as property for constitutional 
purposes or is it still “contingent”?  Id. at 64; David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 677, 698 (2012).  The apparent strength of the pension guarantee under Illinois state 
law suggests that a Takings Clause claim may be tenable in Illinois.  See Beermann, supra note 4, 
at 65–66 (“[T]he Takings Clause is likely to follow the Contract Clause in recognizing only those 
claims that involve unmistakable contractual promises already protected from reduction under 
state law.”).  However, as the strength of this federal constitutional claim hangs on the degree of 
state-law protection of the underlying pension rights, the federal claim is unlikely to add any legal 
heft to a claim based on the state’s Pension Protection Clause.  Moreover, as discussed in greater 
detail infra notes 262–72 and accompanying text, the federal constitutional claims may be 
precluded by the continued existence of a state breach of contract action.  Most importantly, if the 
Supreme Court of Illinois determines as a matter of state law that governmental pension rights are 
not protected against diminution, the federal Takings Clause claim would disappear.  E.g., 
Beermann, supra note 4, at 64 n.226 (citing cases); see Skeel, Jr., supra, at 698 (“The weakness 
of the Takings clause argument lies in the facts that property rights are ordinarily protected only 
up to the value of the underlying property and that the beneficiary’s investment-backed 
expectations would be limited by the uncertainty as to whether the state could make good on its 
unfunded promises.”).  A claim based on the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution—which 
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it would have to adopt a termination standard that falls below federal 
minimum standards applicable to privately sponsored plans. 
The failure of the 2013 reforms to protect previously accrued benefits 
is obvious from the financial projections provided by the sponsors of the 
bill that was eventually enacted.  It is also obvious from even a cursory 
examination of the features of those reforms. 
The modifications are expected to reduce the “current unfunded 
liability” of the state plans by $20 billion.47  That unfunded liability is 
the difference between the actuarial value of the retirement benefits 
already earned by employees and the funds set aside to pay those 
benefits.  By definition, then, the plan must be “diminishing or 
impairing” previously earned benefits, not merely future benefit 
accruals.  The day after the modifications go into effect, some 
employees will be worse off than they were the day before.  The 
actuarial value of the benefits they had already accrued will be lower the 
day after the reform proposal goes into effect than it had been the 
previous day.  They will be lower because the Illinois legislation 
reduces promised annual increases in pension benefits and because it 
increases retirement ages. 
The modification plan cuts back on some employees’ already-accrued 
post-retirement cost-of-living adjustment (“COLA”) increases in two 
ways.48  First, under prior law, COLAs were calculated with respect to 
 
provides that: “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts,” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1—would face the same legal hurdles.  The Illinois Constitution also 
contains protection against governmental takings, see ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15, and against laws 
impairing the obligation of contracts, see id. art. I, § 16.  These constitutional protections might or 
might not be interpreted consistently with federal courts’ interpretations of the similar language 
found in the U.S. Constitution.  Such consistency is not required; interpretation of the language of 
the Illinois Constitution lies wholly within the province of the Supreme Court of Illinois.  
However, it would be nothing short of bizarre for the Court to substantially weaken its past 
interpretations of the Pension Protection Clause in order to legitimate the legislature’s pension 
reforms only to hold that those same pension reforms must be struck down under another state 
constitutional provisions. 
47. See Ray Long & Rafael Guerrero, State House Takes 1st Big Step on Pensions, CHI. TRIB., 
Mar. 22, 2013, at 1.1, 12 (stating that the bill would “immediately cut the unfunded liability by as 
much as $20 billion”). 
48. Some employee groups have objected to the description of Illinois’ post-retirement 
increases as cost-of-living adjustments, as the amount of the adjustments are not specifically 
linked to increases in the Consumer Price Index or any other cost-of-living index.  They prefer to 
use the term “automatic annual increase.”  See Yvette Shields, Illinois Pension Law Challengers 
Lay Out Their Cases, BOND BUYER (Jan. 7, 2014), www.bondbuyer.com/issues /123_5/illinois-
pension-law-challengers-lay-out-their-cases-1058756-1.html (discussing the dispute over 
terminology).  This Article uses “COLA” throughout because it is close enough in meaning and 
more readily recognizable.  Under the pre-reform rules, most Illinois retirees’ benefits increased 
each year by three percent.  Judy Baar Topinka, Illinois State Pension Systems: A Challenging 
Position, FISCAL FOCUS, May 2011, at 6 (May 2011), www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/ 
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an annuitant’s entire pension.49  If an individual qualified for a $60,000 
pension in 2014, the annual increase calculated under prior law for 2015 
would have been three percent of that amount or $1800, resulting in a 
total pension for the year of $61,800.50  Under the new law, the annual 
increase is limited to the lesser of the annual increase calculated under 
prior law or three percent of $1000 multiplied by the annuitant’s years 
of service.51  Assuming this individual had thirty-five years of service, 
the annual increase would be only three percent of $35,000 or $1050, 
resulting in a pension for the year of $61,050.  This differential would 
grow over time, and as a result, the change would be expensive for 
many employees and current retirees.52 
Further, the new law outright eliminates some of the annual COLAs 
for younger workers.53  The legislation provides that up to five of the 
previously annual increases will simply be eliminated, depending on the 
age of the employee on the effective date of the legislation.54  
Employees who are fifty years of age lose only one “automatic annual 
increase”; those who are forty-seven lose three; those who are forty-four 
lose four; and younger employees lose five.55 
Those cutbacks affect COLAs paid with respect to annuity payments 
attributable to services rendered before the pension reform was enacted, 
as well as to annuity payments earned thereafter.  Indeed, even current 
retirees could see their COLAs reduced.  For example, suppose that at 
the time the pension reform bill had been enacted, an employee had 
 
resources/fiscal-focus/may-2011-illinois-state-pension-systems-a-challenging-position/ (see table 
entitled “Tier 1 versus Tier 2 Benefits”).  Employees hired after January 1, 2011, so-called “Tier 
2 employees,” will receive COLAs equal to the lesser of three percent or one-half the rate of 
inflation.  Id. 
49. See Matthew Heimer, Illinois Legislators Pass Pension Reforms, MARKET WATCH (Dec. 
3, 2013), blogs.marketwatch.com/encore/2013/12/03/Illinois-legislators-pass-pension-reforms/ 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2015) (“Under legislation passed in the 1980s, most current Illinois retirees 
get a 3% annual COLA.”). 
50. $60,000 x .03 = $1800.  $60,000 + $1800 = $61,800. 
51. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-119.1(a)(a-1) (2014); Heimer, supra note 49.  The $1000 will be 
adjusted for inflation beginning in 2016.  40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-119.1(a)(a-1). 
52. Complaint, Harrison v. Quinn, No. 2014CH00048 (Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial 
Circuit, Sangamon County, Ill., filed Jan 30, 2014); Complaint, Retired State Emps. Assoc. v. 
Quinn, Topinka, Rutherford & Bd. of Trs. of the State Emps. Retirement Sys., No. 
2014MR000001 (Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, Ill., filed Jan. 
2, 2014) (seeking class action status in lawsuit to declare Public Act 98-599 unconstitutional to 
the extent it “diminishes and impairs the 3% Automatic Increase”). 
53. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/2-119.1.(a)(a-2); STATE UNIVS. RET. SYS. OF ILL., SUMMARY OF 
PUBLIC ACT 98-599 (PENSION REFORM) (2013), available at www.surs.com/pdfs/legal/Pension-
Reform-Summary-SB1.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARY OF PUBLIC ACT 98-599]. 
54. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-119.1(a)(a-2). 
55. Id. at 5/2-119.1(a)(a-2)(2)-(4). 
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accrued enough credits under the pre-existing plan’s terms to become 
entitled to a pension of $48,000 per year starting at her normal 
retirement age.  This employee then continues to work for the state.  
After thirty years of service, when she reaches normal retirement age, 
her additional credits raise her initial benefit to $60,000.  To fully 
protect this employee’s pre-amendment benefit, the state would need to 
pay $60,000 plus an annual, compounded three percent COLA 
adjustment on $48,000 of that amount, plus any COLA due on the last 
$12,000 of base retirement earnings under the new pension law (which 
would be $0 under the terms of current law).  But the pension reform act 
does not do that.  Not only does it provide a COLA for only the first 
$30,000 of the employee’s benefit—thereby entirely eliminating the 
COLA on $18,000 of the $48,000 of already-accrued pension benefit—
but it also completely eliminates several years of COLA on this 
diminished amount.  Under federal law, these diminutions in pension 
benefits would be regarded as illegal clawbacks. 
In addition, the new pension law raises the age at which some current 
workers can start receiving retirement benefits.56  There is nothing 
inherently wrong about raising the retirement age, but again, under the 
federal rules applicable to private employment plans, workers who had 
already-accrued benefits under the old formula would need to be 
compensated for receiving these benefits later (and, given that the law 
does not increase employees’ life expectancy, for a shorter period) 
under the new plan.57  Again, assume that under the old rules, a forty-
three-year-old employee had earned the right to receive a base benefit of 
$20,000 starting at age fifty-five, and then the plan was modified to 
raise the retirement age to age sixty-five.  Assuming a five percent 
discount rate and a life expectancy of eighty-three, the present value of 
a $20,000 per year annuity starting at age fifty-five would be 
$176,916.53.58  The present value of a $20,000 per year annuity starting 
at age sixty-five, however, would be only $86,671.26. 
The higher value of the previously accrued annuity could be 
 
56. Id. at 5/2-119(a)(a-1); see SUMMARY OF PUBLIC ACT 98-599, supra note 53 (showing 
progressive rise in retirement ages); Heimer, supra note 49 (“Workers who are currently age 45 
or under would see their retirement age rise by up to five years.”). 
57. Indeed, under federal law they would have to be allowed the option of receiving the 
already-accrued benefit on the original schedule.  See WEIDENBECK, supra note 31, at 222 
(“Consequently, a defined benefit plan early retirement option, whether subsidized or not, must 
continue to be made available with respect to benefits previously accrued.”). 
58. This example, and the one that follows it, make the simplifying assumption that each 
annual payment is paid, in full, on the first day of the year, and was calculated using EXCEL’s 
XNPV function. 
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protected without compromising the legislature’s ability to change 
benefit accruals going forward.  For example, the retirement payments 
at age sixty-five could be increased to reflect the fact that fewer such 
payments would be received, and that they begin at a later date.  Instead 
of receiving $20,000 per year on account of the years of pre-enactment 
service, the retiree could receive a benefit of $41,000 per year (or 
slightly less) starting on the later date.59  That would be the base upon 
which later benefit accruals would be built.  Private employers are 
forced to make these calculations and adjustments when they eliminate 
incentives for early retirement in their pension plans, but the Illinois 
legislation that changes state pension plans fails to provide such 
monetary adjustments.60  Thus, it would be considered an impermissible 
cutback under federal law. 
Proponents of the legislative change point to two “benefits” that they 
claim offset the detriments suffered by employees under the plan.  First, 
the new pension law decreases the pension contributions required of 
employees covered by the state pension plan.61  Second, the law gives 
employees the right to sue the state if it fails to adequately fund the 
pension fund in the future.62  However, these alleged benefits fail to 
pass a straight face test as adequate compensation for the losses suffered 
by current employees.  First, the purported benefits granted under the 
legislation are not correlated with the losses suffered by individual 
employees as a result of the plan modifications.  Thus, even if the 
 
59. The present value of an annuity of $41,000 starting at age sixty-five would be 
$177,676.10, about $700 in excess of the present value of the original promise. 
60. Some state legislators appear to believe that there is no state law impediment to increasing 
the retirement age, apparently relying on the case Peters v. City of Springfield, 311 N.E.2d 107 
(Ill. 1974), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois held that an ordinance reducing the mandatory 
retirement age of firefighters from sixty-three to sixty years of age did not constitute an 
“impairment” of pension benefits under the Pension Protection Clause even though it would 
prevent some firefighters from earning enough service credits to qualify for the maximum 
possible pension under Illinois law.  Id. at 111–12.  The Court in that case distinguished between 
an unprotected “right to work until a specified age” and “a pension benefit.”  Id. at 109.  It held 
that the Pension Benefit Clause protected only the quantum of benefits earned while an employee 
worked for the state, but did not protect any employee’s right to continue to work and earn 
additional benefits.  Id. at 112 (“Municipal employment is not static and a number of factors 
might require that a public position be abolished, its functions change, or the terms of 
employment modified.”).  Raising the retirement age—the age at which an employee can start to 
receive his or her retirement annuity—as explained above, supra notes 56–60 and accompanying 
text, clearly diminishes the quantum of retirement benefits earned by an employee during his or 
her working years.  Thus, Peters provides no support for a state law rule more favorable than the 
federal one. 
61. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-126(c). 
62. Id. at 5/2-125(c)-(d) (explicitly waiving the “State’s sovereign immunity solely to the 
extent that it permits the Board to commence a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of 
Illinois” to pay pension contributions). 
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amount of “new” benefits provided to employees as a group under the 
new legislation matched the losses imposed by this legislation on 
employees as a group, some individual employees will be 
undercompensated while others are overcompensated. 
The most significant monetary offset—a one percent decrease in 
future pension contributions—is explicitly tied to the provision of 
future, rather than past, services.  An employee may be made “whole” 
from a monetary perspective for the reduction in his or her COLA on 
past accrued benefits only if he or she continues to work for the state for 
long enough that those reductions in pension contributions add up to the 
same amount as the lost COLA benefits.63  But that is a condition many 
employees (and certainly current retirees64) will not meet.  Moreover, 
even if an employee were to be fully compensated through the reduction 
in pension contributions, this compensation would be a consequence of, 
and a return on, the provision of future services; it would not exist on 
the day the plan changed.  The day the reforms were effective, which 
under federal law would be the relevant date for determining whether 
accrued benefits are fully protected,65 the actuarial value of the 
employee’s accrued benefits would be lower than the previous day, 
when the entire accrued retirement benefit was entitled to an annual 
(and compounded) three percent COLA. 
Furthermore, the second alleged offset—granting employees the right 
to sue the state in the future for failing to make adequate payments to 
the pension fund—also fails to make up for a diminution of already-
accrued pension benefits.  Indeed, it is hard to see how this “benefit” 
provides employees with any financial benefit at all, given that the 
adequacy (or not) of the State’s advanced funding of pension benefits 
does not provide Illinois with a legal excuse for failing to fulfill its legal 
 
63. Suppose, for example, that an employee earning $60,000 retires the following year with a 
pre-COLA retirement benefit of $40,000.  In his last year of employment, the employee’s pension 
contribution would be reduced by one percent of his $60,000 salary, or $600,  However, he will 
lose the COLA attributable to $5000 of his annuity—three percent of $5000, or $150—each year 
for as long as he lives.  If he lives as little as four years, he would be a net loser.  Whether any 
particular employee gains or losses from the exchange would depend on the length of time prior 
to retirement (how much he would save in retirement contributions) as well as the amount of his 
or her pre-COLA annuity (how much COLA he would lose).  Because the point of the Pension 
Reform Act is to reduce Illinois’ pension costs, see Long & Guerrero, supra note 47 (estimating 
cost savings), the state must be expecting that there will be more losers than winners under the 
new scheme. 
64. Current retirees will lose COLA benefits without gleaning any offsetting advantages, as 
they have ceased making pension contributions. 
65. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-3(a)(4) ex. 1 (2012) (“[T]he plan amendment fails to satisfy the 
requirements of section 411(d)(6)(A) because the amendment decreases the accrued benefit of 
Participant N . . . immediately before the applicable amendment date.”). 
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obligation to pay promised retirement benefits.66  This is particularly 
true given the absence of any legal regime under which a state might 
declare bankruptcy and reduce its pension obligations.67  Finally, it is 
highly unlikely that the legislative offsets come anything close to 
making employees as a class whole; if it did, there would be no 
decrease in unfunded liability. 
Interestingly, in some respects the legislation does protect accrued 
 
66. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Illinois made precisely this point in cases in which it held 
that employees could not sue the state for failing to adequately fund its employee pension plans.  
See, e.g., People ex rel. Sklodowski v. Illinois, 695 N.E.2d 374 (Ill. 1998); McNamee v. Illinois, 
672 N.E.2d 1159 (Ill. 1996); People ex rel. Ill. Fed’n of Teachers v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749 
(Ill. 1975).  The court pointed out that the records of the Constitutional Convention make clear 
that no such funding obligation exists.  Helen Kinney, the major proponent of the Pension 
Protection Clause, stated in no uncertain terms in response to questions from others, that the 
Pension Protection Clause did not obligate the state to provide advance funding for these plans.  
Sklodowski, 695 N.E.2d at 378 (“This court in McNamee exhaustively reviewed the debates from 
the convention . . . [and] found that the ‘transcripts from the convention make clear that the 
purpose of the amendment was to clarify and strengthen the right of state and municipal 
employees to receive their pension benefits, but not to control funding.’”).  At the time of the 
Constitutional Convention, the pension plans were only about forty percent funded.  See Shields, 
supra note 48 (“In 1970, the state’s unfunded liabilities were $2.5 billion and the [retirement] 
system was just 41.8% funded.”).  Moreover, the court has repeatedly suggested that it might 
uphold a funding requirement in the event it appeared likely that the State would default on its 
obligations to pay promised benefits.  See, e.g., Sklodowski, 695 N.E.2d at 379; McNamee, 672 
N.E.2d at 1166.  This dicta suggests that state employees and retirees may have had this right 
under prior law due to the parlous conditions of the state treasury further undermining the 
contention that the “new” funding right contained in the 2013 pension reform act conferred an 
offsetting benefit on retirees. 
67. Historically, the absence of a bankruptcy regime for state governments has been tied to 
constitutional concerns.  See Skeel Jr., supra note 46, at 707 (noting concerns about 
impermissible interference with state sovereignty and Contracts Clause obligations).  However, 
more recent scholarship suggests those objections could be overcome by enacting a state 
bankruptcy law “that could be invoked only by the state itself . . . .”  Id. at 708.  In addition, states 
may not have felt the need for such a regime because the combination of the Eleventh 
Amendment’s prohibition of federal court jurisdiction over suits against states by out-of-state and 
foreign plaintiffs, see JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE 
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 7 (1987) (“Always a dollars-and-cents 
proposition, the Amendment was adopted to overturn an early Supreme Court decision that an 
out-of-state plaintiff could sue a state in federal court to enforce a debt.”), and the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, which prevented the prosecution of such suits in state courts, historically has 
allowed states to simply repudiate distasteful debts, see id. at 4–6 (describing historical instances 
of repudiation of state debt).  These “obstacles to collection” obviated the most “familiar 
justification for bankruptcy . . . inefficient liquidation,” Skeel Jr., supra note 46, at 686–687, 
although he points out that “[t]he ugly repercussions of default would linger,”  id. at 706.  One 
question is whether these obstacles undercut the supposed ironclad constitutional protection of 
pension benefits—or whether (in Illinois) the Pension Protection Clause constitutes a limited 
waiver of sovereign immunity granting state courts the power to order payment of employee 
pensions.  Thus far, Illinois seems to be operating under that assumption; at the very least, it has 
not defended itself against previous state lawsuits brought by pensioners’ on jurisdictional 
grounds. 
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benefits.  For example, the legislation imposes caps on the amount of 
salary that can be counted when calculating an employee’s pension 
benefits.68  However, the legislation specifically provides that in the 
case of current employees, the cap will be the higher of the newly 
imposed legislative limits or those employees’ compensation as of the 
effective date of the legislation.69  It also protects current employees’ 
rights to receive service credits for accumulated vacation and sick 
days.70  But it does not protect all accrued benefits of current 
employees. 
In sum, even assuming the Supreme Court of Illinois reverses its 
prior precedent71 and declares that the Illinois Constitution’s rule 
against impairing pension benefits—like ERISA—protects only 
already-accrued pension benefits, many of the modifications made to 
the state pension plans in 2013 should or would not survive judicial 
scrutiny.  But it is likely that the Supreme Court of Illinois will hold the 
state to an even higher standard of protection. 
B.  Protecting Future Accruals: The Apparent Illinois Rule 
Although Justice Scalia reviles the practice of using legislative 
history to interpret statutes,72 “[w]hen discerning the purpose of 
constitutional provisions,” the courts of Illinois “attach great weight to 
the Record of Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention.”73  
Unfortunately for proponents of pension reform in Illinois, one of the 
co-sponsors of the Pension Protection Clause, Helen Kinney,74 
repeatedly made clear that she believed that it was meant to “guarantee 
that people will have the rights that were in force at the time they 
 
68. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-103.10 (2014). 
69. Id. at 5/14-103.10(h). 
70. Id. at 5/14-104.3; id. at 5/14-106. 
71. This possibility cannot be entirely discounted.  After all, judges in Illinois are elected 
officials, and thus are at least somewhat responsive to public opinion, which is not 
overwhelmingly favorable to state employees.  As elaborated infra note 78, however, there is as 
yet no sign that the courts are reconsidering their prior precedents. 
72. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (“It is our task, as I see it, 
not to enter the minds of the Members of Congress . . . but rather to give fair and reasonable 
meaning to the text of the United States Code . . . .”); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 
191–92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies 
between Congressmen . . . are frail substitutes for bicameral votes upon the text of a law . . . .”). 
73. Vill. of Sherman v. Vill. of Williamsville, 435 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
74. Helen Kinney was the first female assistant state’s attorney in DuPage County, and later 
became its first female judicial appointee.  She was later elected to the position of circuit judge.  
Kiley M. Whitty, From Our President, DUPAGE ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, http://www.dawl. 
org/home (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
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entered into the agreement to become an employee.”75  As a result, 
Illinois courts have consistently held that changes in pension rules that 
adversely affect employees can only affect employees hired after the 
date of the changes, and previous pension reform legislation carefully 
protected pre-existing employees.76  The courts have not distinguished 
between changes in previously accrued benefits and those earned 
through the performance of future services. 
Others have ably made the argument that it is illogical from a public 
policy standpoint to have a rule holding that pension accrual formulas 
must be held constant (or be a one-way upward ratchet) once an 
employment relationship begins when cash salary and other types of 
benefits can vary over time.77  I do not disagree with that judgment.  It 
is probably unfortunate that the Illinois Constitutional Convention took 
place in 1970 rather than after the enactment of ERISA, when the 
constitution’s drafters may have been more sensitive to the distinction 
between already accrued and merely anticipated pension benefits and 
made a more nuanced policy decision.  However, past decisions of the 
Illinois courts indicate that they will take the Kinney language to heart 
when interpreting the meaning of the Pension Protection Clause of the 
Illinois Constitution and will strike down the recently enacted pension 
 
75. Verbatim Transcript of July 21, 1970, in 4 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 2893, 2931–32 (1972); see id. at 2929 (“[The Pension 
Protection Clause] is simply to give them a basic protection against abolishing their rights 
completely or changing the terms of their rights after they have embarked upon the 
employment—to lessen them.”).  For an excellent and exhaustive description of the struggle to 
get the Pension Protection Clause included in the Illinois Constitution, see Eric M. Madiar, Is 
Welching on Public Pension Promises An Option for Illinois? An Analysis of Article XIII, Section 
5 of the Illinois Constitution 10–20 (July 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1774163. 
76. For example, pension reform legislation enacted in 2011 created two sets of employees, 
Tier 1 employees, hired before the effective date of the legislation, and Tier 2 employees, hired 
after the effective date of the legislation; reductions in pension benefits contained in that 
legislation affected only Tier 2 employees.  See Topinka, supra note 48, at 6 (“Public Act 96-
0889, effective January 1, 2011, made substantial changes to the pension plan for new 
government employees in Illinois by creating what is known as ‘Tier 2.’”). 
77. See, e.g., Amy Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule” and its Impact on 
Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1033 (2012) (protecting employees’ rights to 
future retirement benefit accruals “contrary to general contract theory . . . [and] create[s] 
economic inefficiency, in that it fixes in place one part of an employee’s compensation . . . .  
Viewed holistically, the California Rule simply does not protect employees’ economic interests, 
and in some cases may even harm the interests of the very employees it is meant to protect”); 
Alicia H. Munnell & Laura Quinby, Legal Constraints on Changes in State and Local Pensions, 
25 CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT B.C., Aug. 2012, at 1, 3, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/slp_25.pdf (“But future benefits, much like future payroll, should be 
allowed to vary based on economic conditions.”). 
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reforms on that basis.78 
Illinois courts have consistently held that an employee’s rights in the 
pension system “vest” on the later of two dates: the date on which the 
employee enters the system by making contributions to the plan, or the 
date on which the 1970 Constitution containing the Pension Protection 
Clause became effective.79  Most importantly, “vesting” has been 
interpreted as applying to the benefit accrual formula itself.80  On 
several occasions, Illinois courts have held that a state employee’s 
pension rights are “governed by the actual terms of the Pension Code at 
the time the employee becomes a member of the Pension system,”81 so 
that only employees hired after the effective date of an adverse change 
in pension terms can be affected by the change.82 
 
78. Indeed, in the first test of the 2013 legislation, a circuit court judge granted a preliminary 
injunction against the implementation of the new pension rules.  This judge followed up his 
preliminary injunction with a decision holding that the 2013 legislation violated the Pension 
Protection Clause of the Illinois Constitution.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text 
(discussing multiple pension lawsuits that were merged and held the legislation invalid).  The 
Supreme Court of Illinois is expected to rule on the appeal of that decision in the spring or 
summer of 2015.  Some believe that political pressures will militate some relaxation of its 
precedent, as the justices are elected officials.  See id. (“But even Mr. Raucci isn’t making any 
predictions about the court, which is not just a legal but a political body . . . .”).  There is as yet no 
indication of such a relaxation.  Indeed, on July 3, 2014, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in a case 
of first impression, extended the reach of the Pension Protection Clause to cover state 
contributions to health insurance premiums for retirees.  In Kanerva v. Weems, 13 N.E.3d 1228 
(Ill. 2014) the court reversed an appellate court’s dismissal of challenges to the constitutionality 
of Public Act 97-695, which amended the State Employees Group Insurance Act of 1971 by 
eliminating standards for the state’s contributions to health insurance premiums for members of 
three of the state’s retirement systems.  Id. at 1230.  Stating that “where there is any question as to 
legislative intent and the clarity of the language of a pension statute, it must be liberally construed 
in favor of the rights of the pensioner,” id. at 1244, the court held uncompromisingly that “the 
State’s provision of health insurance premium subsidies for retirees is a benefit of membership in 
a pension or retirement system within the meaning of [the Pension Protection Clause] . . . and the 
General Assembly was precluded from diminishing or impairing that benefit for those employees, 
annuitants, and survivors whose rights were governed by the version of section 10 of the Group 
Insurance act that was in effect prior to the enactment of Public Act 97-695.”  Id. 
79. See, e.g., Barber v. Bd. of Trs. of Vill. of S. Barrington Police Pension Fund, 630 N.E.2d 
446, 450 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Hannigan v. Hoffmeister, 608 N.E.2d 396, 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); 
Schroeder v. Morton Grove Police Pension Bd., 579 N.E.2d 997, 999 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Carr v. 
Bd. of Tr. of Peoria, 511 N.E.2d 142, 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
80. People ex rel. Sklodowski v. Illinois, 695 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ill. 1998); McNamee v. 
Illinois, 672 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (Ill. 1996); Di Falco v. Bd. of Trs. of Firemen’s Pension Fund of 
Wood Dale Fire Prot. Dist. No. 1, 521 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Ill. 1988). 
81. Sklodowski, 695 N.E.2d at 378; see McNamee, 672 N.E.2d at 1162; Di Falco, 521 N.E.2d 
at 925. 
82. Employees “vest” in beneficial changes by continuing to work and contribute to the 
pension plan after such changes have been adopted.  E.g., Gualano v. City of Des Plaines, 487 
N.E.2d 1050, 1051–52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Taft v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension Fund of Vill. of 
Winthrop Harbor, 479 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).  Although retirees likely can be stripped 
of benefit enhancements enacted subsequent to their retirement, it is unclear how many such 
ROIN PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2015  1:20 PM 
766 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  46 
For example, in Buddell v. Board of Trustees, State University 
Retirement System of Illinois, the state university hired an employee in 
1969.83  In 1969, employees were allowed to purchase service credit in 
the state retirement plan for time spent in military service.84  In 1974, 
the Illinois Pension Code was amended to provide that credit for 
military service would only be allowed for those who “have applied for 
such credit before September 1, 1974.”85  Although Buddell was 
eligible to apply for this credit before September 1, 1974,86 he did not 
apply or pay the necessary fee for the credits prior to this date.87  
Instead, he attempted to apply for the credit in 1983, and was denied.88  
Both the circuit court89 and the Supreme Court of Illinois held that this 
denial was improper because his contractual “right to purchase the 
additional credit” could not be divested by the legislature.90  The fact 
that he delayed making the required payment for such credits until well 
after the date of the pension amendment was deemed irrelevant; what 
“vested” was not the benefit itself, but the pension formula under which 
he had a “right to purchase additional credit.”91 
Similarly, Illinois courts have refused to apply revised definitions of 
“final salary” for purposes of determining the retirement benefits of 
employees hired before the adoption of those revisions.  In Kraus v. 
Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of the Village of Niles,92 a 
policeman sued to have his retirement benefits determined under the 
formula applicable at the time he was hired, rather than the revised 
 
situations exist or how much money is involved.  The Illinois Attorney General’s brief in the 
pension litigation points to retirees and dependents receiving pensions in 1989, at the time the 
COLA provision was first enacted, as examples of parties who should be considered to have no 
protection against the loss of that benefit.  Eric M. Madiar, Illinois Pension Reform: What’s Past 
Is Prologue, ILL. PUB. EMP. RELATIONS REP., Summer 2014, at n.238 and accompanying text, 
available at https://www.kentlaw.edu/ilwreport/index.php/2014/09/volume-31-issue-3-summer-
2014/2/. 
83. 514 N.E.2d 184, 185 (Ill. 1987). 
84. Id. (“At the time that Dr. Buddell became employed by the University, the version of 
section 15–113 in effect allowed employees to purchase service credit for time spent in the 
military service.”). 
85. 108 1/2 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15–113(i) (1969) (current version at 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-
113.1 (West 1985)). 
86. Buddell, 118 N.E.2d at 185.  His military service predated his university service.  Id. 
87. Id. at 185 (“In 1983, Dr. Buddell applied to the University Retirement System to purchase 
military service credit.”). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 185–86 (citing circuit court opinion). 
90. Id. at 188 (“The rights to exercise this option and to make these additional payments are 
contractual rights . . . and the legislature cannot divest the plaintiff of these rights.”). 
91. Id. at 187. 
92. 390 N.E.2d 1281 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). 
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formula that was effective on the date he became eligible to retire.93  
The court could have decided in favor of the patrolman on the narrow 
ground that the more favorable formula was in place on the last day that 
he provided services for the Village of Niles,94 and thus the retirement 
benefits, in a very real sense, already had been “earned” at the time of 
the legislative change.95 However, the court specifically and 
deliberately sought to establish the more expansive rule, that “[the 
Pension Protection Clause] prohibits legislative action which directly 
diminishes the benefits to be received by those who become members of 
the pension system prior to the enactment of the legislation, though they 
are not yet eligible to retire.”96  The court was not persuaded by the 
argument that its decision “will freeze pension legislation for at least 20 
years, thus making the repeal of section 3-114 not truly effective until 
1993,”97 pointing out that “the Pension Laws Commission attempted to 
have language allowing a reasonable power of legislative modification 
added to the section or read into the debates to establish intent, but no 
such action was taken during the convention.”98 
The Supreme Court of Illinois adopted this absolutist position in Felt 
v. Board of Trustees.99  In 1982, the Illinois Code was changed, 
redefining the basis for computing retirement annuities from the salary 
on the last day of service to the average salary for the final year of 
service, a matter of some moment in years in which mid-year salary 
increases occurred.100  Again, the court could have limited its holding to 
protect only the portion of the benefit earned prior the date of the 
legislative change.  The outcome of the case would have been a little 
 
93. Id. at 1283 (“The issue is whether the trial court erred in holding that under section 5 of 
article XIII of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, plaintiff was entitled to receive a pension based on a 
section of the Pension Code in effect at the time of his entry into the pension system . . . although 
the section was subsequently repealed and replaced prior to the time plaintiff retired or became 
eligible to retire.”). 
94. See id. at 1283 (detailing the chronology).  The plaintiff was placed on disability leave in 
October 1967, approximately four years before the statutory change in pension terms was 
effective, and never returned to active service; he applied for regular retirement status after 
accruing twenty years of service through a combination of eleven years of active service and nine 
years of disability leave.  Id. 
95. This reasoning would have been consistent with the decision in Peifer v. Bd. of Trustees of 
the Police Pension Fund of the Village of Winnetka, 342 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), in 
which the court held that the pre-amendment retirement benefits formula applied to determine the 
benefits to be received by a policemen because he was eligible to retire prior to the date the new 
rules came into effect.  Id. at 134–35. 
96. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1292–93. 
97. Id. at 1294. 
98. Id. 
99. 481 N.E.2d 698 (Ill. 1985). 
100. Id. at 699. 
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different, but almost the entire benefit at issue would have been 
protected under that lesser standard of protection.  Instead, the court 
dismissed the legislature’s concerns about underfunding of pension 
plans and the state’s budgetary concerns, while deliberately making the 
broad holding that the amendment was “unconstitutional as applied to 
these plaintiffs and to other judges in service on or before the effective 
date of the amendment.”101 
If the Supreme Court of Illinois continues to apply this standard, 
additional features of Illinois’ new pension law will be struck down.  
For example, the newly imposed caps on the amount of salary that can 
be taken into account for pension calculations would be 
unacceptable.102 
Although the position taken to date by the Illinois courts may seem 
extreme, it is far from unusual.103  Some of the courts that formerly 
adopted similar positions under their state contracts clauses have 
repudiated those positions, but several states continue to uphold 
comparable levels of protection of retirement benefits under either their 
contracts clauses or more particularized state constitutional pension 
protection clauses.104 
 
101. Id. at 702.  Likewise, the court could have based its decision on another constitutional 
provision, one specifically forbidding the reduction of judicial pay, but it chose not to.  ILL. 
CONST. art. VI, § 14. 
102. See 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-103.10(g) (2014) (imposing limits).  As discussed supra 
notes 68–69 and accompanying text, under the old law, a Tier 1 employee’s entire salary was 
taken into account for purposes of calculating his or her base pension; under the new law, the 
amount of salary taken into account is capped at the greater of the employee’s salary on the 
effective date of the legislation or the cap established by statute (currently about $110,000).  40 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-103.10(h). 
103. See Monahan, supra note 77, at 1032 (“[C]ourts in California and the twelve other states 
that have adopted California’s precedent have held not only that state retirement statutes create 
contracts, but that they do so as of the first day of employment. . . .  [C]ourts interpreting the 
California Rule have held that the contract protects not only accrued benefits (a relatively 
uncontroversial position) but also the rate of future accrual.”); Munnell & Quinby, supra note 77, 
at 2 tbl.2 (identifying states’ legal justifications for protecting pension rights).  The “California 
Rule” is built around more general proscriptions against “impairment of contracts” rather than a 
provision such as the one found in the Illinois constitution specifically protecting retirement 
benefits.  See Monahan, supra note 77, at 1032 (describing the “California Rule”).  Professor 
Monahan argues that the impairment-of-contracts doctrine, as ordinarily applied in federal and 
some state courts, would not protect employees against changes in the rate of future pension plan 
accruals, and thus that the various states applying the rule differently in the pension contract 
context are wrong as a matter of law as well as policy.  Id. at 1032–33 (noting that the 
interpretation is “contrary to federal Contract Clause jurisprudence, . . . contrary to general 
contract theory, [and] it also appears to create economic inefficiency”).  Whatever the merits of 
Professor Monahan’s Contracts Clause argument, thus far, the Supreme Court of Illinois has held 
Illinois to a higher standard under the Pension Protection Clause. 
104. Id. at 1071 (listing states that adopted the California Rule). 
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Of course, nothing prevents the Supreme Court of Illinois from 
reconsidering its prior decisions and deciding that, after all, the Illinois 
Pension Protection Clause protects only already earned pension 
benefits, leaving the legislature free to reduce future accruals on a 
prospective basis.  Indeed, as discussed above, most if not all of the 
holdings (as opposed to the expressed rationales) in the previously 
decided cases are consistent with the federal standard of protecting 
accrued benefits while allowing the diminution of prospective benefits.  
Some forecast such a turnaround, inasmuch as the members of the court 
are elected officials and hence subject to pressure from a tax-averse 
electorate.105  But such a turnaround is by no means assured. 
More importantly, as also discussed above, the courts would have to 
go much further than that to uphold the current set of pension reforms.  
To uphold the current set of reforms, the Supreme Court of Illinois 
would have to accept the state’s argument that the legislature can reduce 
already-accrued benefits under its “reserved sovereign powers 
(sometimes referred to as the State’s police powers),”106 and essentially 
 
105. See Phil Ciciora, Is Illinois’ Pension Reform Constitutional?, THE NEWS-GAZETTE 
(December 8, 2013, 8:00 AM), www.news-gazette.com/opinion/guest-commentary/2013-12-
08/illinois-pension-reform-constitutional.html (contrasting views of two University of Illinois law 
professors, John Columbo and Laurie Reynolds).  Certainly, the court’s recent decision in 
Kanerva v. Weems (for a discussion of the case, see supra note 78) does not indicate the court’s 
receptiveness to such arguments.  See Monique Garcia et al., Court Affirms Pension Rights, CHI. 
TRIB., July 4, 2014, at 1.1 (“While the state’s highest court did not rule directly on new state laws 
altering pension benefits of public employees and changes in retiree health care for some Chicago 
workers, the language of its decision signaled that a majority of justices believe the constitution 
protects public employees’ retirement benefits from legislative attempts to diminish them.”). 
106. See Answer and Defenses at 19, In re Pension Reform Litig., Retired State Emps. Assoc. 
v. Quinn, No. 2014 MR 1 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon Cnty. May 15, 2014) (defending the legislation).  
The Illinois Attorney General has also taken the position that the three percent COLA benefit is 
“‘not part of the core pension benefit’” protected by the Pension Clause.”  Madiar, supra note 82, 
at nn.237–43 and accompanying text.  Although she may be right as to some of the COLA 
beneficiaries, see id., the argument is quite weak for those employees who began or continued 
working after the institution of the COLA in 1989.  Although some state (not Illinois) lower court 
judges have distinguished between base pensions and cost-of-living adjustments, see Mary 
Williams Walsh, Two Rulings Find Cuts in Pensions Permissible, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2011, at 
B1, the Supreme Court of Arizona, in a state which has in its constitution a provision almost 
identical to Illinois’ Pension Protection Clause, recently refused to distinguish between base 
pension benefits and statutory benefit increases, holding both equally protected against 
impairment.  See Fields v. Elected Officials Ret. Plan, 320 P.3d 1160, 1165–66 (Ariz. 2014) 
(concluding that both were “embraced by the term ‘benefits’ in the Pension Clause”).  The 
Supreme Court of Colorado upheld that state’s right to reduce its COLA provision in the case 
referred to in the Walsh article, but Colorado does not have the equivalent of the Pension 
Protection Clause in its state constitution.  The case was brought under the state’s Contracts 
Clause, and critical to the court’s decision was its presumption against creating a contractual right 
“unless there is a clear indication of the legislature’s intent to be bound.”  Justus v. State, 336 
P.3d 202, 209 (Colo. 2014).  The court found that no such intent existed because the COLA 
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read the Pension Protection Clause out of the state constitution.  It is 
past time to start working up real solutions to the pension problems 
facing Illinois.  This Article now turns to some possibilities. 
There are two quite disparate parts to the pension problem.  One 
consists of cleaning up the mess created in the past; the second is 
devising mechanisms to prevent the recurrence of similar problems in 
the future.  The first entails raising more revenue; the second requires 
coming up with a pension scheme going forward, at least for new 
employees, that is not as subject to the dysfunctional habits of the 
Illinois state government and yet protects the interests of state 
employees.  There are no simple or pleasant answers for either of these 
questions.  But the following Parts of this Article attempt to sketch out 
some sensible possibilities. 
II.  RAISING REVENUE: ADDING RETIREMENT INCOME 
TO THE INCOME TAX BASE 
Although investment losses have played a small part in the 
underfunding of Illinois’ pension plans, the legislature’s systemic 
underfunding of its plans has played a far larger role.  The plans’ assets 
had already fallen far short of their accrued liabilities in the year the 
constitutional drafters adopted the Pension Protection Clause,107 and, 
with few exceptions, their finances have steadily worsened over time.  
Indeed, until 1981, the state’s “budgetary policy” consisted of paying 
current benefit outlays out of current state revenues108 while using 
employee contributions to build the pension reserve.109  The state 
abandoned that policy due to “fiscal stress” and sharply reduced state 
contributions in 1982 and 1983; its contributions then “increased 
modestly through fiscal year 1995.”110 
These modest increases nowhere near compensated for rising pension 
expenditures.  In 1995 alone, the state contributed a mere $519 million 
to the funds while retirement fund expenditures amounted to $1.9 
 
provisions “do not use the word ‘entitled,’ nor do they include any similar words creating an 
unmistakable vested contractual right.”  Id.  Moreover, the Court noted that “the COLA formula 
paid to retirees changed repeatedly during the employment of each named retiree . . . .”  Id. at 
210.  It is worth noting that many of the other states where COLA-reducing reforms were upheld 
also lacked the equivalent of Illinois’ Pension Protection Clause, which provides an independent 
basis for arguing that the statutory language provided an enduring claim. 
107. See Shields, supra note 48 (describing the shortfall). 
108. Topinka, supra note 48, at 4.  Technically, the state contributed this amount to the 
pension trust, which disbursed the funds to retirees.  Id. 
109. Id.  Although bearing “no relation to actuarial calculations of liability,” this funding 
program “guarantee[s] a steady increase in state contributions.”  Id. 
110. Id. 
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billion.111  Alarmed at the growing shortfall, the state legislature passed 
legislation in that year creating a fifty-year plan to achieve ninety 
percent funding of the plans.112  After a fifteen-year period of phasing 
in higher pension contributions, the plan required the legislature to 
contribute a set percentage of payroll until the plans were ninety percent 
funded.113  Between higher contributions and the booming stock 
market, the plans reached 74.5% funding in fiscal year 2000—only to 
fall back to a funding ratio of 48.6% by the close of fiscal year 2003 due 
to a combination of falling equity values, increases in pension 
liabilities—”caused in part by benefit increases”114—and shortfalls in 
state contributions.115  In fact, with the exception of 2004, when the 
state deposited most (but not all!) of the proceeds of a $10 billion 
general obligation bond floated specifically to provide funds for state 
pension plans,116 the state has never contributed an amount sufficient to 
cover its actuarially computed pension obligation for the year—the 
amount necessary to cover that year’s increase in pension liabilities, 
plus interest on accrued contribution shortfalls—let alone money to eat 
away at that deficit.117 
 
111. Id. 
112. Id. (referring to P.A. 88-593, effective July 1, 1995). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 4–5.  According to a Pew Foundation Report, only 4.19% of the current funding 
shortfall can be traced back to benefit increases, PEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 3, but it does 
seem odd that the legislature would increase benefits due under an already underfunded plan.  
The benefit increases consisted of sweetening the benefit accrual formula (from 2.2% of final 
average salary to 3% of final average salary per year of creditable service plus the provision of 
mechanisms through which covered employees could purchase additional years of service credit.  
See COMM’N ON GOV’T FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL 
CONDITION OF THE STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS FY 2010, at 7–8 (2011) [hereinafter 
FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2010] (describing P.A. 91-0927, P.A. 92-0014, and 
P.A. 92-0566, and outlining changes). 
115. See PEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 3 (“Approximately one-third of the growth is 
attributable to employer contribution shortfalls . . . .”).  The PEW Report attributes 33.55% of the 
total shortfall to “Employer Underfunding” and almost as much, 31.56%, to “Lower Investment 
Returns.”  Id.  However, the “lower investment returns” could easily be ascribed to “employer 
underfunding” as one time-honored mechanism for understating the amount of actuarially 
required employer contributions is to over-estimate expected investment returns on plan assets.  
See WIEDENBECK, supra note 31, at 265 (“Experience showed that plan sponsors in financial 
difficulty often minimized their minimum funding obligation by adopting overly optimistic 
assumptions regarding investment performance . . . .”).  Although some of the Illinois retirement 
plans reduced their investment expectations in 2011, they remained “toward the upper end in the 
assumptions of rate of return.”  Topinka, supra note 48, at 5. 
116. See Topinka, supra note 48, at 4 (depicting “State Contributions and Retirement System 
Expenditures”). 
117. See COMM’N ON GOV’T FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY, ILLINOIS STATE 
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE STATE RETIREMENT 
SYSTEMS FY 2013, at 113 app. M (2014), (showing employer contributions falling short of 
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The dismal state of its pension funds is just one aspect of Illinois’ 
larger fiscal problems.  For many years, Illinois has been spending more 
money than it has been raising in taxes.118  Even if the state slashes 
future spending, it will have to increase taxes to make up for those past 
expenditures.119  But which taxes, and from whom? 
One very natural move—and perhaps a permissible clawback of 
sorts—would be to expand the base of the income tax by eliminating the 
state’s income tax exclusion for retirement income.  Adding retirement 
income to the income tax base will not bring in enough revenue to solve 
Illinois’ pension woes,120 but it would be a start.  Most of all though, it 
would be the right move from a fairness perspective.  It would place 
part of the burden of financing the pension shortfalls on the people 
responsible for creating them in the first place: residents who underpaid 
for the costs of the governmental services they received in earlier 
years.121  In addition, those who favor the rollback on state employee 
COLAs should also favor the inclusion of retirement in income, as it has 
much the same effect; although the state will pay pension benefits 
 
actuarial increases in benefit liabilities in every year from 1996–2013, save 2004, the year in 
which the state deposited some of the proceeds of a bond issue in the plans); FORECASTING & 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2010, supra note 114, at 24 (detailing changes in unfunded liabilities 
from 2006–2012).  The state even reduced its pension contributions when the stock market 
boomed from 2005–2007.  FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2010, supra note 114, at 
24.  See generally Karen Eilers Lahey & T. Leigh Anenson, Public Pension Liability: Why 
Reform Is Necessary to Save the Retirement of State Employees, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 307, 319–20 (2007) (explaining Illinois’ unfunded pension debt as a combination of 
“annual state contributions of less than the necessary actuarial amount, increased pension 
benefits, investment losses, and a downturn in the economy”); Madiar, supra note 82, § II 
(tracing the history of underfunding from 1917 to the present). 
118. See STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, ILLINOIS REPORT 16 (2012), available at www. 
statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/2012-10-12-Illinois-Report-Final-2.pdf (“[T]he 
origins of the structural gap between spending growth and sustainable revenues can be traced to 
the 1990s.”). 
119.   After winning the election, Governor Rauner declared that: “[o]ur financial condition is 
far worse than has ever been discussed publicly before,” suggesting that he may be more 
amenable to revenue raising measures than his campaign indicated.  Bob Secter et al., Rauner’s 
Great Red-Ink Challenge, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 2015, 1.1, 6.  However, his first budget proposal 
focuses on spending cuts.  See Ray Long, Protesters Descend on Capitol Building, CHI. TRIB., 
March 12, 2015, at 1.4 (“‘Gov. Rauner . . . is committed to solving [the budget crisis] without 
raising taxes on hardworking families and without irresponsible borrowing.’”). 
120. Thomas A. Corfman, Civic Federation: Keep Most of Illinois’ ‘Temporary’ Income Tax 
Hike, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Mar. 3, 2014, http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/2014030 
3/NEWS02/140309994/civic-federation-keep-most-of-illinois-temporary-income-tax-hike.  “The 
exemption cost Illinois roughly $2 billion in fiscal 2012.”  Id.  “Illinois’ pension debt has grown 
by $79 billion since 2001” or more than $6.5 billion per year.  PEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 3. 
121. Given Illinois’ climate, it is unlikely that many people move to the state to retire.  Most 
retirees are individuals who have aged in place, and thus are the same individuals whose taxes 
failed to cover the cost of past governmental spending from which they benefited. 
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inflated by the COLA, part of that benefit will have to be returned to the 
state treasury in the form of income taxes.122 
At present, Illinois law contains one of the country’s most extensive 
tax exemptions for retirement income.  It excludes from its income tax 
base payments made under public pension plans, private pension plans, 
Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRAs”), 401(k)s, social security 
benefits, redemptions of U.S. retirement bonds, qualified annuities, and 
Keogh plans.123  Although most states exclude some retirement income 
from the base of their state income taxes,124 only four other states have 
similarly generous exclusions.125  There is no need for Illinois to be 
such an outlier.126 
 
122. This Article takes no position on the question of whether Illinois state employees (taking 
cash salaries and benefits into account) are routinely overpaid, as more than enough ink has 
already been spilled on this question.  For a sampling of the contrasting views on this subject, see 
ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T. EXCELLENCE, COMPARING 
COMPENSATION: STATE-LOCAL VERSUS PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS 8 (2011), available at 
slge.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/BC-brief_Comparing-Compensation_12-082.pdf (“The 
estimated difference nationwide is about 4% in favor of private sector workers.”); Beermann, 
supra note 4, at 16–26; Andrew G. Biggs & Jason Richwine, Overpaid or Underpaid? A State-
by-State Ranking of Public-Employee Compensation 59 tbl.2 (Am. Enter. Inst. Pub. Pol’y 
Research, Working Paper No. 2014-04), available at www.aei.org/files/2014/04/24/-biggs-
overpaid-or-underpaid-a-statebystate-ranking-of-public-employee-
compensation_112536583046.pdf (rating Illinois as paying its employees a “[v]ery large 
premium” of more than 20% in excess of comparable private employees).  It is beyond dispute 
that any reduction in pension benefits constitutes a reduction in overall salary, which not only 
hurts current employees but also reduces the attraction of such jobs going forward.  This will 
likely adversely affect the pool of potential state employees, possibly diminishing the quality of 
future public services.  Lunch is rarely free. 
123. Kelly Soderlund, A Plan to Tax Retirement Income, AARP BULL., June 2014, at 36; 
Illinois, RETIREMENT LIVING INFO. CTR., https://www.retirementliving.com/taxes-alabama-
iowa#ILLINOIS (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
124. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE PERSONAL INCOME TAXES ON 
PENSIONS & RETIREMENT INCOME: TAX YEAR 2010, at 2 (2011), available at 
www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal /taxonpensions2011.pdf.  Thirty-six of the forty-one states with 
personal income taxes “offer exclusions for some or all specifically identified state or federal 
pension income or both,, [sic] a retirement income exclusion, or a tax credit targeted at the 
elderly.”  Id. 
125. Id. at 3 (Alabama, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Mississippi). 
126. There is no argument in Illinois, as there is in some states, that the income tax exemption 
constitutes part of the state retirement system protected under the Pension Protection Clause. 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 
803 (1989), that granting immunity from state income taxation to state and local pension benefits 
and not federal pension benefits violated the statutory and constitutional principles of 
intergovernmental tax immunity, a number of states that had previously exempted only state and 
local pension benefits had to choose between taxing all governmental retirement benefits or none.  
Oregon and North Carolina were among the states that had included specific language 
guaranteeing state tax exemptions in their pension statutes.  When they attempted to repeal those 
exemptions, state employees sued, claiming that the removal of the exemptions violated either 
state constitutional provisions against impairment of pension benefits or state contracts clauses.  
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A.  The History of the Exclusion 
Tax relief for seniors127 got off to a slow start in the United States.  In 
1916, when the federal personal income tax was enacted, none of the 
seven states that had income tax systems provided preferential treatment 
for seniors.128  The first state to enact such a preference was Vermont.  
It exempted pensions from the tax base when it enacted a revised 
version of its income tax in 1931.  However, the exemption appears to 
have been an oversight.129  It took another sixteen years for other states 
to begin providing tax relief for seniors. 
The first significant income tax relief provided for seniors at the 
federal level came in the form of an administrative ruling excluding 
social security benefits from income.130  Most states followed the 
federal government’s lead in treating those benefits as tax exempt.131  
The first legislated tax relief came in the form of uniform exemption for 
 
Although these claims were successful in Oregon and North Carolina, see, e.g., Bailey v. State, 
500 S.E.2d 54, 60 (N.C. 1996) (holding unconstitutional a law revoking the state tax exemption 
for pension benefits paid by state and local governments); Hughes v. Oregon, 838 P.2d 1018, 
1035 (Or. 1992) (holding the same), they were rejected in several other states.  E.g., Spradling v. 
Colo. Dept. of Revenue, 870 P.2d 521, 524 (Colo. App. 1993) (upholding the limitation of tax 
exemption for beneficiaries of state disability benefits against a Contracts Clause claim because 
“neither the statutory language nor the surrounding circumstances manifest an intent on the part 
of the General Assembly to create a contractual entitlement to the tax exemption”); In re Request 
for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2011 PA 38, 806 N.W.2d 683, 698 (Mich. 
2011) (upholding the constitutionality of a law reducing or eliminating statutory tax exemption 
for public pension income); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 305 (N.M. 1995) (upholding the 
dismissal of a class action challenging a law revoking the tax exemption for public pension 
benefits).  The impairment argument is even less tenable in Illinois, inasmuch as, as the 
discussion infra notes 140–50 makes clear, in Illinois the pension tax exemption was neither 
codified as part of the pension statute, nor was it ever restricted to governmental pension 
payments, let alone state and local governmental pensions.  As a benefit granted historically to all 
retirees, it cannot be described as a feature of a program for state employees, and like any other 
tax exemption or benefit, may be altered or removed by the legislature.  Finally, the Illinois 
Constitution specifically provides that “[t]he power of taxation shall not be surrendered, 
suspended, or contracted away,” ILL CONST., art. IX, §1, which would have made any attempt to 
protect such an exemption from revocation ultra vires. 
127. I use the term “seniors”—and not “retirees”—deliberately.  Most of the early instances of 
tax relief were linked to age (sixty-five plus) and not employment (or former employment) status. 
128. Karen Smith Conway & Jonathan C. Rork, The Genesis of Senior Income Tax Breaks, 65 
NAT’L TAX J. 1043, 1045 (2012). 
129. Id. (describing Vermont’s exclusion in 1931 as “due to an oversight rather than a 
deliberate action”). 
130. Id. at 1046.  It appears that the ruling was, or speedily became, controversial within the 
Treasury Department.  See id. (citing U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Div. of Tax Research, Individual 
Income Tax Exemptions, in TAX STUDIES 8–17 pt. 10, at 26 (1947)) (discussing the problems 
associated with such exceptions). 
131. Id. at 1046 n.7. 
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seniors that was not tied to the source of the senior’s income.132  The 
Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, Harold Knutson, began 
pushing for the federal income tax to include a special $500 exemption 
for persons over the age of sixty-five in 1945,133 although it was not 
added to the Internal Revenue Code until the passage of the Revenue 
Act of 1948.134  Vermont preceded the federal government by one year, 
adding a $500 exemption in 1947, the same year it revised its income 
tax base to include pension income.135 
Once the federal government adopted the senior exemption, states 
began following suit.  First was Colorado, the home of the chief sponsor 
of the Senate bill containing the exemption, enacting a senior exemption 
of $750.136  By 1960, fifteen states and the District of Columbia had 
adopted some form of senior exemption, credit, or deduction.137  
Additional states included such provisions in the design of newly 
adopted income tax systems.138  The practice is now virtually 
universal.139 
States started adopting pension-specific exclusions in the 1970s.  
Illinois was among the first.140  When it adopted its first income tax in 
1969, it treated pensions as a form of investment income, taxable to the 
extent their value had been generated after the August 1, 1969 
enactment of the tax.141  This cut-off date was removed in 1971, 
permanently exempting pensions from the tax base.142  There was little 
or no discussion of this change at the time, suggesting it may have been 
 
132. Id. at 1047. 
133. Id. 
134. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, 62 Stat. 110 (1948) ($600 exemption); Conway 
& Rork, supra note 128, at 1047. 
135. Conway & Rork, supra note 128, at 1047 (finding “no evidence” of a relationship 
between the adoption of the exemption and the inclusion of pension income in the tax base). 
136. Id. at 1048, 1050 tbl.1 (indicating that Colorado adopted the senior exemption in 1948). 
137. Id. at 1049; see id. fig.2A (identifying the adoption of a senior exemption by state and 
year). 
138. Id. at 1049.  Illinois was included in this group; the state adopted its first income tax in 
1969.  Id. 
139. See id. (“By 1980, 90 percent of states with income taxes had an 
exemption/deduction/tax credit for the elderly.”). 
140. See id. at 1053 (noting that Illinois adopted its pension exemption in 1969 after 
Delaware, Hawaii, and Maryland).  There were two earlier, and short-lived, pension exemptions. 
Vermont excluded pensions from its income tax base from 1931–1947, when it enacted a senior 
exemption.  Id. at 1051.  Delaware excluded pensions from its income tax base from 1947–1953.  
Id.  Hawaii exempted pensions from its income tax beginning in 1953.  Id.  In 1965, Maryland 
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viewed as a simplification device.143 
Shortly after Illinois adopted its exemption, however, other states 
began adopting their own pension exemptions144 in a deliberate attempt 
to attract pensioners.145  Pensioners were regarded as desirable citizens, 
because the federal government covered most of the costs of servicing 
their needs and they neither need schools nor occupy expensive prison 
space.146  Yet few states then provided, or today provide, exclusions 
that are as generous as the exclusions Illinois provides.  Only four other 
states exempt all retirement income from their tax base,147 although ten 
exempt all governmental pensions from income.148  Six states and the 
District of Columbia tax out-of-state pensions more heavily than 
distributions from federal or in-state governmental plans.149  Fourteen 
states and the District of Columbia fully tax private pension income.150  
 
143. See id. (proposing that the limitation may have been removed to simplify and expedite 
the state’s taxation). 
144. See id. (“[W]idespread diffusion of pension exemptions did indeed begin around 1972.”). 
145. E.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 124, at 1 (“State policies 
on retirement income exclusions vary greatly, but have one or both of two purposes: to protect the 
income of taxpayers who are no longer in the workforce, and to serve as an economic 
development tool by attracting retired people to, or retaining them in, a state.”); Conway & Rork, 
supra note 128, at 1066 (noting that while the first few states seemed to adopt pension 
exemptions “due to oversights, legal expediency or . . . accidental breaks already in 
place[,]”  states began to use the exemptions as “weapon[s] of policy competition.”). 
146. Conway & Rork, supra note 128, at 1052 (“This chronology of federal expenditure 
programs demonstrates how the needs of the elderly . . . were systematically taken over by the 
federal government such that by 1972 the vast majority of these needs were met by the federal 
rather than the state government.  Such a shift in responsibilities could have the effect of making 
the elderly as a whole—not just the very rich—valuable to a state.”); id. at 1056 (“In sum, our 
investigation into the history of federal and state income tax breaks for the elderly suggests that 
the first tax breaks were due to oversights, but that they ended up lending justification for more 
tax breaks . . . [and the pension exemption] has become a weapon of policy competition.”). 
147. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 124, at 3 (identifying the four 
states as Alabama, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Mississippi). 
148. Id. at 2 (noting the ten states as Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, and Pennsylvania). 
149. See id. at 5–13 (itemizing in table form each state’s treatment of retirement income).  The 
six states are: Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, New York, West Virginia, and the District of 
Columbia.  Id.  Michigan and Massachusetts tax out-of-state governmental pensions less 
favorably than in-state pensions unless the source state extends reciprocal treatment to their 
pensioners.  Id. at 8.  States that exempt pensions paid by their own state plans must also exempt 
pensions paid by the federal government.  See Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 
(1989) (holding that the Michigan statute taxing federal retirement benefits and not state 
government retirement benefits violated the Public Salary Tax Act).  They are not, however, 
required to exempt pensions paid by other states’ governmental plans, and, as noted above, some 
continue to treat out-of-state plans less favorably. 
150. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 124, at 5–13 (including 
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia). 
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Many of the exclusions are capped. 
B.  Does the Exclusion Make Sense? 
The justification for granting income tax favors to seniors (and 
pensions) has always been less than clear-cut,151 and in today’s 
economic conditions, may be perverse.  In absolute terms, the elderly 
are now better off than younger workers.  They are, for example, less 
likely to be living in poverty.152  They are also wealthier.153  Although 
the elderly may not be able to compensate for financial adversity by 
seeking employment, as can many younger people,154 all but the very 
oldest155 probably have a higher standard of living than younger 
taxpayers with equivalent incomes.156  Employment costs, such as 
 
151. See Conway & Rork, supra note 128, at 1044 (“[O]ur research suggests that these tax 
breaks . . . appear to have accidentally made their way into the tax code; once in place, however, 
their diffusion—especially that of pension exemptions—appears driven by competitive and 
political factors.”). 
152. See Judith A. Seltzer & Jenjira J. Yahirun, Diversity in Old Age: The Elderly in 
Changing Economic and Family Contexts, in DIVERSITY AND DISPARITIES: AMERICA ENTERS A 
NEW CENTURY 270, 280 (John R. Logan ed., 2014) (“In 1970 the elderly were much more likely 
to be poor than were children, with about 16 percent of those under eighteen living in poverty 
compared to 27 percent of those who were at least sixty-five years old.  By the end of [2009], 
almost 19 percent of children were poor compared to slightly less than 10 percent of the 
elderly . . . .”); Richard Fry et al., The Old Prosper Relative to the Young: The Rising Age Gap in 
Economic Well-Being, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 1, 5 (Nov. 7, 2011), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011 
/11/WealthReportFINAL.pdf (showing a higher percentage of households headed by adults 
younger than thirty-five in poverty in 2010 than those headed by adults ages sixty-five or older); 
Young, Underemployed and Optimistic: Coming of Age, Slowly, in a Tough Economy, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. 1, 2 (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/02/young-
underemployed-and-optimistic.pdf (“In a 2004 Pew Research survey, similar shares of young 
adults (50%), middle-aged adults (52%) and older adults (50%) rated their personal financial 
situation ‘excellent’ or ‘good.’  By 2011, a large gap had opened up between older adults and 
everyone else . . . .”). 
153. Although older households should have greater wealth than younger ones, because they 
should have accumulated retirement savings, the wealth disparity has grown over time.  In 1984, 
the median net worth of households headed by adults aged sixty-five and older was ten times that 
of households headed by adults younger than thirty-five; in 2009, the ratio was forty-seven times.  
See Fry et al., supra note 152, at 1 (noting the widening gap of median net wealth between the 
age groups). 
154. This inability is often cited as grounds for providing tax favors to seniors.  Conway & 
Rork, supra note 128, at 1047–48 (citing the proponents of federal tax relief for seniors in 1948). 
155. The oldest old may suffer from severe disabilities requiring extensive and expensive 
care.  See Jonathan Barry Forman, Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance, 
Pensions, and Financial Products, 21 ELDER L.J. 375, 380 (2013) (“The poverty rate increases 
with age. . . .  Disability and institutionalization generally increase with age.”). 
156. See Alicia H. Munnell et al., The National Retirement Risk Index: An Update, CTR. FOR 
RET. RESEARCH AT B.C., Oct. 2012, at 2, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012 
/11/IB_12-20-508.pdf (“People clearly need less than their full pre-retirement income to maintain 
[their pre-retirement standard of living] once they stop working since they pay less in taxes, no 
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commuting costs, can be quite high.  Moreover, many younger workers 
support dependents, whose expenses far outstrip the limited tax relief 
provided for them.   
Nor is it clear that the income of retirees is any more “fixed” than that 
of many workers.  A large part of most seniors’ income, social security, 
is automatically adjusted for inflation.157  Worker salaries are not 
automatically adjusted for inflation, and in the last ten years, many 
workers—and especially poor workers158—have seen their wages grow 
by less than the rate of inflation.159  Nor is it necessarily easy for 
younger workers to increase their incomes by working more hours or 
taking another job.  In fact, many already work two jobs.160  Others 
have few job skills, or have skills that are no longer in demand.  In 
 
longer need to save for retirement, and often have paid off their mortgage.”). 
157. About fifty-five percent of the income derived by households headed by adults aged 
sixty-five and older comes from social security.  See generally Seltzer & Yahirun, supra note 
152.  Social security benefits have been automatically adjusted for inflation since 1975.  Alicia H. 
Munnell & Dan Muldoon, The Impact of Inflation on Social Security Benefits, CTR. FOR RET. 
RESEARCH AT B.C., Oct. 16, 2008, at 1, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2008 
/10/ib_8-15.pdf  (noting that “keeping pace with inflation is one of the attributes that makes 
Social Security benefits such a unique source of income,” but pointing out ways in which this 
inflation protection is undermined by Medicare premium increases and income taxes); Cost-of-
Living Adjustment: History of Automatic Cost-of-Living Adjustments, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://w 
ww.ssa.gov/news/cola/automatic-cola.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).  As discussed below, state 
and local government employees may not be covered by social security.  However, some state 
pension plans provide more generous cost of living increases than does social security. 
158. David Leonhardt & Kevin Quealy, U.S. Middle Class No Longer World’s Richest, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 23, 2014, at A1, A14 (“Among the poor, incomes in the United States have declined 
or stagnated in real terms after 1980 [and] . . . per capita income has declined between 2000 and 
2010 at the 40th percentile, as well as at the 30th, 20th, 10th, and 5th.”). 
159. Alec Friedhoff & Howard Wial, Work, in BROOKINGS METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, 
STATE OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA, 118, 119 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/research/files/reports/2010/5/09%20metro%20america/metro_america_report.pdf (“From 
1999 to 2008, the inflation-adjusted earnings of high-wage workers grew by 3.4 percent.  This 
occurred while hourly earnings for middle-wage workers fell by 4.5 percent and the wages of 
low-wage workers fell by an even greater 8.3 percent.”); Jonathan Weisman, Economic Yields 
Few Benefits for the Voters Democrats Rely On, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2014, A14 (“Income for 
households in the exact middle of the income distribution declined 4.26 percent from 2009 to 
2012. . . .  [P]retax income for the top 1 percent grew by 31 percent over that same time frame.  
The other 99 percent saw income growth of 0.4 percent.”); Tom Kertscher, Even Adjusting for 
Inflation, Most Americans’ Wages Haven’t Increased in Over 10 Years?, POLITIFACT WIS. (Feb. 
23, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2014/feb/23/barack-obama/ 
even-adjusting-inflation-most-americans-havent-see/ (“So, the inflation-adjusted median wage 
during the final quarter of 2013 was $334—$1 lower than during the final quarter of 1999, more 
than a decade earlier.”); The Lost Decade of the Middle Class, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 1 (Aug. 22, 
2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/22/the-lost-decade-of-the-middle-class/ (“Since 
2000, the middle class has shrunk in size, fallen backward in income and wealth . . . .”). 
160. See Weisman, supra note 159 (“Nearly 6.7 million people reported holding multiple jobs 
as Americans prepared to vote in 2010.  That number now tops more than seven million.”). 
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today’s economy, many workers are unemployed or underemployed.161  
Indeed, seniors now have a lower poverty rate than younger workers.162 
Having said that, it must be acknowledged that the standard of living 
enjoyed by many retirees’ may be lower than the one they enjoyed 
during their working years.  Pensions (including social security), after 
all, are rarely intended to replace 100% of a worker’s former salary.163  
Additional retirement funds are supposed to come from private 
savings.164  Private savings equalize living standards at both ends.  
Money that is diverted to savings cannot be used to improve one’s 
lifestyle during one’s working years, thus lowering the baseline for 
comparing post-retirement living standards.  Dissaving during 
retirement provides funds to improve one’s living standards in those 
years.  People who failed to accumulate private retirement savings—and 
that includes many Americans165—thus face a diminished standard of 
living in retirement. 
However, there is no reason current workers should compensate past 
workers (by paying higher taxes) for failing to save for retirement.  The 
necessary tax increases would make it harder for current workers both 
to save for their own retirements, and to enjoy a comparable standard of 
 
161. See Econ. Policy Inst., The Great Recession: Unemployment and Underemployment, 
STATE OF WORKING AM., http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/great-recession/ unemployment 
-and-underemployment/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2015) (“Around 27 million workers—roughly one 
out of every six U.S. workers—are either unemployed or underemployed.”); News Release, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Household Data: Table A-15. Alternative Measures of Labor 
Underutilization (Jan. 9, 2015), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t15.htm 
(showing twelve percent of U.S. workers “unemployed, plus all persons marginally attached to 
the labor force, plus total employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of the civilian 
labor force plus all persons marginally attached to the labor force” as of August 2014). 
162. See generally Seltzer & Yahirun, supra note 152. 
163. And indeed, median income for households headed by the elderly ($43,401) is lower than 
that of all households ($57,297); households headed by adults aged forty-five to fifty-four 
($70,118) and fifty-four to sixty-four ($69,847) are considerably higher.  Fry et al., supra note 
152, at 20. 
164. Not surprisingly, households headed by adults aged sixty-five and older have the highest 
median net worth.  Id. at 2.  Moreover, the wealth gap between younger and older households is 
expanding.  Id. at 1 (noting that the median net worth by households headed by adults aged sixty-
five and older ten times that of households headed by adults younger than thirty-five in 1984; by 
2009, it was forty-seven times). 
165. Approximately thirty-five percent of Americans over age sixty-five rely entirely on 
social security for their income, and thirty-six percent of Americans do not save anything for 
retirement.  Retirement Statistics, STATISTICS BRAIN, http://www.statisticbrain.com/retirement-
statistics/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).  However, eighty-two percent of Americans over the age of 
fifty-five claim to have saved money for retirement.  EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. & 
GREENWALD & ASSOC., 2014 RCF FACT SHEET: AGE COMPARISONS AMONG WORKERS 1 
(2014), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/surveys/rcs/2014/RCS14.FS-4.Age.Final.pdf. 
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living in their younger years.166  Indeed, current workers could end up 
providing seniors with a higher standard of living in retirement than 
they themselves are likely to enjoy at any point in their lives.  
Moreover, current workers will inevitably end up paying (at least in the 
state of Illinois) for a large portion of the governmental benefits 
received by the earlier generation anyway since the taxes generated by 
taxing retirement income will not come close to financing the 
accumulated pension shortfall.  From a redistributive perspective then, it 
is hard to defend forcing younger workers to compensate older workers 
for the entirety of their overspending, both personal and governmental. 
If there is any argument for exempting retirement income from the 
base of the state income tax, it must be the competitive one.  If one fears 
that including retirement income in the base of the state income tax will 
cause retirees to leave or avoid coming to the state, the state treasury 
(and younger workers) might be a net loser.  It depends on whether the 
benefits (including the benefit of paying other forms of Illinois tax, such 
as property and sales tax) of having retirees in the state exceed the costs 
of servicing them.  While it is true that seniors rarely have children still 
in need of expensive school services, seniors are hardly maintenance 
free.  Like other residents, they benefit from fire protection and police 
services, roads and public transit, and myriad other public services.  
And it is unclear that including retirement income in the income tax 
base would impel many retirees to move out of state, as many attractive 
retirement destinations include some or all pension income in the base 
of their income taxes; moreover, many retirees prefer to stay within 
their existing social and kinship networks rather than move away.167 
 
166. See Seltzer & Yahirun, supra note 152, at 270 (“Within families the economic welfare of 
the oldest generations has improved compared to the welfare of the younger generations.”); 
Jeanna Smialek, Lean Nest Eggs for Gen X as Wealth Lags, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 2014, 2.5 (“Gen 
Xers might have to live on just half their pre-retirement income, compared with 60 percent for the 
baby boom generation. . . .  ‘They are not doing well relative to the last generation.’”); Fry et al., 
supra note 152, at 1 (“Households headed by older adults have made dramatic gains relative to 
those headed by younger adults in their economic well-being over the past quarter of a century.”); 
Munnell et al., supra note 156, at 6 (“Today’s working households will be retiring in a 
substantially different environment than their parents did.  The length of retirement is increasing 
as the average retirement age hovers at 63 and life expectancy continues to rise.  At the same 
time, replacement rates are falling. . . .  The NRRI shows that, as of 2010, more than half of 
today’s households will not have enough retirement income to maintain their pre-retirement 
standard of living, even if they work to age 65 . . . and annuitize all of their financial 
assets . . . .”). 
167. In general, the level of state taxes has little impact on most Americans’ interstate moves.  
Michael Mazerov, State Taxes Have a Negligible Impact on Americans’ Interstate Moves, CTR. 
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (May 21, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-8-14sfp.pdf; see 
Karen Smith Conway & Jonathan C. Rork, No Country for Old Men (Or Women)—Do State Tax 
Policies Drive Away the Elderly?, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 313, 315 (2012) (“Our results are 
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If the state legislature is truly concerned about competitiveness for 
senior citizens, though, it might be more productive to think about 
options for how to tax retirement income rather than whether to tax 
retirement income.  As the discussion below reveals, a tax on retirement 
income can be structured in a way that minimizes the dangers posed by 
retirees leaving the state, though doing so would be far from easy. 
C.  Structuring the Taxation of Retirement Income 
Assuming the sole obstacle to imposing a tax on the retirement 
income of Illinois retirees is the fear that doing so will encourage 
retirees to leave for more tax favored climes, Illinois could structure this 
tax to minimize the benefits of leaving the state.  Unfortunately, the 
easiest mechanism for doing so is out of reach, due to federal law.  It 
would be convenient if Illinois could tax residents on their retirement 
income (with a credit for income taxes, if any, paid to a source state on 
income attributable to employment outside the state) and nonresidents 
on any retirement income earned through the performance of services in 
Illinois.168  Illinois employees would not be able to escape such a tax on 
their retirement income by moving to a lower tax state; indeed, the tax 
could be effectuated through a withholding tax imposed on the 
retirement payment at source, just like wage withholding is imposed on 
salary income. 
Unfortunately, in 1996, Congress enacted Public Law 104-95,169 
which makes this alternative impossible.  This law prohibits state 
taxation of the retirement income of nonresidents.170  The fact that this 
 
overwhelming in their failure to reveal any consistent effect of state tax policies on elderly 
migration across state lines.”). 
168. This is, incidentally, how wage income is taxed. 
169. Act of Jan. 10, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-95, § 114, 109 Stat. 979 (1996) (codified as 4 
U.S.C. § 114). 
170. 4 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2012).  This law was enacted in response to earlier efforts by other 
states to tax such income.  Federal Statute Enacted Prohibiting State Income Taxation of Certain 
Pension Income of Nonresidents, STATE & LOCAL TAX BULL. (Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman 
LLP., New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1996, available at http://www.pmstax.com/state/ 
bull9602.shtml.  The “prime mover behind this legislation” was the congressional delegation of a 
destination state, Nevada.  Id.  The income covered by the legislation includes “most qualified 
and tax-favored plans under the Internal Revenue Code.  Also exempt is ‘any plan, program, or 
arrangement described in section 3121(v)(2)(C)’ of the I.R.C. if the income from such plan, 
program, or arrangement is part of a series of substantially equal periodic payments (not less 
frequently than annually) made for either the life or life expectancy of the recipient or a period of 
not less than 10 years.”  Timothy P. Noonan, The Ins and Outs of New York Nonresident 
Allocation Issues, 55 STATE TAX NOTES 439, 440 (2010); see Jean M. Klaiman, Take the Money 
and Run: State Source Taxation of Pension Plan Distributions to Nonresidents, 14 VA. TAX REV. 
645, 647–49 (1995) (discussing the inner workings of nonresident pension plans and the 
advantages for which individuals use them); cf. Walter Hellerstein & James C. Smith, State 
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simple alternative is unavailable does not mean, however, that 
nonresident retirees’ retirement income cannot be taxed at all.  What it 
does mean is that a state’s regime for taxing such retirement benefits 
must be more convoluted.  The tax must be imposed before the resident 
leaves the state.  The way to do that is to tax pension contributions 
rather than—or in addition to—taxing pension distributions.171 
If the state wants to maintain—for state income tax purposes—the 
level of tax favoritism granted to such plans under federal tax law, it can 
require all contributions made to retirement plans on behalf of Illinois 
employees to be included in the income tax base in the year such 
contributions are made while excluding all distributions from the tax 
base.172  This may not be easy, but it is possible. 
As a technical matter, it is relatively simple to determine on an 
annual basis the amount of contributions made to an employee’s 
account under a defined contribution plan.173  Employees benefiting 
from such plans have individual accounts and receive periodic reports 
of the contributions to such accounts.  Employer contributions could be 
added to employees’ wages174 on their information returns, and the 
 
Taxation of Nonresidents’ Pension Income, 56 TAX NOTES 221, 223 (1992) (“States plainly 
possess the power, under the Due Process Clause, to tax income derived from sources within the 
State, even if the income is recognized years later when the taxpayer no longer has any 
connection with the state . . . .”). 
171. Obviously, as discussed below in infra notes 179–92 and accompanying text, should the 
state decide to tax distributions as well as contributions, to avoid double taxing pension income it 
would have to allow recipients an offset for taxes paid with respect to those contributions. 
172. This would mimic the tax treatment of contributions to Roth IRA accounts.  See I.R.C. § 
408A(c)(1) (2012) (disallowing deductions for contributions to such accounts); id. § 408A(d)(1) 
(excluding distributions from income).  If one assumes constant tax rates and normal rates of 
return, this tax treatment is indistinguishable from that accorded other qualified pension plans for 
which a deduction for contributions is allowed up-front and distributions are fully taxable; both 
exclude the investment return on the contributed assets from tax.  Edward J. McCaffery, A New 
Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 825 (2005) (“[T]he equivalence of the prepaid 
and postpaid consumption taxes . . . holds under just two seemingly innocuous conditions, 
constant tax rates and constant rates of return.”).  In the real world, though, not only do tax rates 
change but “‘windfall’ or ‘inframarginal’ returns to capital” exists as well, and in many of those 
situations, a tax payable on distributions rather than on contributions is preferable.  Id. at 827. 
173. Indeed, it may be simpler to determine the amount of contributions attributable to 
services provided in a given state than distributions attributable to such service.  One of the 
justifications proffered for restricting source state taxation of pension distributions was the 
difficulty inherent in determining the source of pension income received by retirees who had 
worked in multiple jurisdictions.  Klaiman, supra note 170, at 662–63. 
174. Alternatively, employers may be denied a deduction for such contributions.  Id. at 666.  
The revenue consequences would be the same if the employer’s tax rate matched that of its 
employees.  However, even if that were true (and often it would not be—many employers are 
either tax-exempt or generate losses, eliminating their tax liability), the political optics (an 
additional tax levied on local businesses) would probably be unacceptable. 
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deduction eliminated for employee contributions.175  The only difficult 
issue is deciding whether the taxes due on such contributions should be 
payable out of the retirement accounts, in the form of (at least for 
employer contributions) a lower contribution accompanied by additional 
tax withholding from funds that otherwise would have been directed 
into the accounts, or whether employees should be faced with paying 
the entirety of the tax on the diverted income out of other funds.  
Requiring employees to pay these taxes out of other income or funds 
would certainly be easier from a mechanical point of view and would 
maximize the amount of funds deposited in such accounts.176  However, 
employees may lack the liquidity to bear the full cost of the tax out of 
current salary,177 and prefer to pay some of it by reducing the amount of 
income diverted into a retirement account.  Different employees may 
have different preferences on this issue, and employers may be forced to 
choose between them.  Further, if contributions are reduced in order to 
pay the state income tax levy, employers will have to decide whether 
those payments count as “contributions” for purposes of triggering an 
employer “match.” 
Taxing contributions to defined benefit plans is more difficult 
because employees do not gain rights to any particular contributions (or 
funds in a pension trust) prior to the time those funds are distributed in 
the form of retirement distributions.  Although employee contributions 
to such plans can be included in their taxable income (i.e., no deduction 
allowed) with ease, the amount of employer contributions is (or at least 
should be) determined on the basis of actuarial calculations made with 
 
175. Many states adjust the federal income tax base for state tax purposes by “adding in” 
items (such as interest from municipal bonds) excluded or deducted from federal taxable income; 
retirement contributions could be just another addition. 
176. The rate of withholding on cash salary, for example, might be increased to ensure that 
such taxpayers do not arrive at the end of the tax year with a large, outstanding tax liability.  By 
contrast, using money from the retirement account to pay taxes due on a contribution could have 
unwelcome federal tax consequences.  The money so used would probably be treated for federal 
tax purposes as a “distribution” from the account, which not only would be includable in federal 
taxable income but, depending on the age of the employee, might also be subject to an additional 
tax as a “premature distribution.”  This is the treatment accorded funds withdrawn from 
traditional IRAs, which are used to pay the income taxes due upon the conversion of the 
traditional IRA to a Roth IRA.  See Marvin Rotenberg, Roth IRA Conversion 10% Penalty Trap, 
SLOTT REP. (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.irahelp.com/slottreport/roth-ira-conversion-10-penalty-
trap (noting that funds used to pay taxes due on conversion to Roth IRA “are not actually 
converted to the Roth, so they will be subject to the 10% penalty, in addition to income tax, when 
the consumer is under the age of 59 ½”). 
177. Klaiman, supra note 170, at 666–67 (“[I]ncluding pension plan contributions in adjusted 
gross income at the time of the contribution would place economic hardships on employees, be 
seen as a tax increase, and contradict federal tax policies aimed at encouraging pension plan 
contributions.”). 
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reference to its entire workforce and is not, in the first instance, 
allocable to any particular employee.178  Thus, it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to back out the contribution made on behalf of particular 
employees for purposes of including such amounts in their income for 
tax purposes.  As a practical matter, this means that any tax on employer 
contributions to such plans will likely have to be paid by the employer. 
However, this raises additional issues.  For example, the state would 
have to decide what rate to apply.  The easiest way to effectuate such a 
tax would be to eliminate the employer’s deduction for such 
contributions, which would have the effect of taxing the contributions at 
the employer’s tax rate.  Given that some employers are tax exempt or 
incur losses, this leaves open the possibility that the tax would not raise 
any revenue, defeating the point of the tax.  The alternative would be to 
mandate a specific tax rate at which contributions would be taxed, a rate 
that approximates employees’ tax rate.  While that would generate 
additional money for the state, this additional tax payment effectively 
serves as a salary increase for the employees unless their employers can 
negotiate offsetting reductions in their cash salaries—especially if the 
tax on contributions is part of a two part tax, with taxes levied both on 
contributions as made and on distributions, as discussed infra notes 
183–92 and accompanying text, and retirees are allowed either a credit 
or exclusion for amounts previously taxed in the hands of the 
employer.179  Indeed, without such an adjustment, state employees 
would be held harmless from any tax imposed on their retirement 
contributions,180 while the tax would become an additional tax on 
private employment in Illinois!181  Multistate employers operating 
defined benefit plans will confront an additional problem in that they 
will have to determine which portion of their contribution is attributable 
to services performed by Illinois employees and which to employees 
 
178. Though this is certainly true of traditional defined benefit plans, under some variants of 
these plans—such as “cash balance plans”—individual allocations may be a realistic possibility. 
179. It is unclear, however, how such an attribution would be made. 
180. The state, as the employer, would be responsible for paying the tax on the contribution 
(to itself—so this would be a wash); if the tax “paid” then reduced the amount of tax payable on 
the retirement distribution in the year of said distribution, the state would derive no tax revenues 
even though a tax was “imposed” on these contributions. 
181. Given the diminution in active defined benefit plans maintained by private employers, 
this may not be a significant problem.  See William J. Wiatrowski, The Last Private Industry 
Pension Plans: A Visual Essay, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS: MONTHLY LABOR REV., Dec. 
2012, at 3 (“In 2011, only 10 percent of all private sector establishments provided defined benefit 
plans, covering 18 percent of private industry employees. . . .  In addition to the decline in 
coverage, recent trends among these plans reflect employer decisions to convert to cash balance 
plans or limit future accruals.”). 
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rendering services in other states. 
Contributions would be taxed in the year, and in the amount, made.  
If a pension trust runs short of the funds necessary to pay promised 
benefits, any funds contributed by an employer to make up the deficit 
would be treated as additional, taxable contributions to the trust.182 
In the short run, of course, merely taxing contributions to pension 
plans would not raise much in the way of tax revenue—and certainly 
not from the right people—for the simple reason that the bulk of the 
pension contributions that will be used to finance the retirement benefits 
paid to the baby boom generation have already been made.183  Unless 
the contributions tax is explicitly made retrospective, past contributions 
will escape the tax.  Thus, for a transitional period at least, Illinois will 
need to impose a tax on pension distributions as well as contributions.  
To avoid double taxation, of course, this tax on distributions would need 
to take into account any taxes previously paid on contributions.  The 
question then becomes how this should be done.  Several alternative 
mechanisms exist, with different practical and theoretical implications. 
The choices again are both easier to implement and to understand in 
the context of defined contribution plans rather than defined benefits 
plans.  If Illinois wants to replicate the tax treatment of Roth Individual 
Retirement Arrangements (“Roth IRAs”) at the federal level, employees 
would need to set up separate retirement accounts to hold contributions 
on which the Illinois tax had been paid—just as they need to set up 
separate accounts to distinguish between Roth IRAs and regular IRAs.  
Distributions from the taxed contribution accounts would be exempt 
from further Illinois taxation, while distributions from the other account 
would be fully includable in income, assuming the retiree still lived in 
Illinois. 
Suppose, however, that Illinois concludes that the federal tax benefit 
for retirement savings is sufficient, and it should tax the investment 
income derived from the investment of taxed pension contributions just 
 
182. If the employer’s contributions relate to benefits payable to employees located in many 
states, the contribution would have to be allocated between them. 
183. Large numbers of the baby boom generation have already retired, and thus have ceased 
adding to their retirement accounts.  Others have only a few working years left in which to make 
contributions.  See Matthew Boesler, Here’s What’s Really Going On With Baby Boomers and 
The Labor Force, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 24, 2014, 4:28 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/2014 
1113224915/http://www.businessinsider.com/baby-boomers-are-retiring-2014-2 (“Millions of 
‘baby boomers’. . . have retired from the workforce over the past six years.”); Tom Sightings, 12 
Baby Boomer Retirement Trends, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. MONEY (July 22, 2014 11:05 AM), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/on-retirement/2014/07/22/12-baby-boomer-retirement-tre 
nds (“[P]eople born between 1946 and 1964, are starting to turn 65 and beginning to retire in 
droves. . . .  About 65 percent of workers retire by the time they turn 65.”). 
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as it taxes other investment income.  It would have two options.  One 
would be to tax this investment income on a yearly basis, i.e., to include 
in employees’ taxable income each year that year’s increase in the value 
of their retirement account(s).  Distributions would be includable only 
to the extent they exceeded the amount previously taxed.184  
Minimizing the tax on distribution minimizes the benefits of moving to 
another state upon retirement, but accelerating the tax burden may 
create liquidity issues for employees, particularly given federal 
restrictions on premature withdrawals from pension accounts.185  These 
liquidity concerns can be dealt with through advance planning, but may 
require a degree of financial expertise that is beyond that possessed by 
most workers. 
Taxing retirement distributions, rather than the yearly increases in 
account balances, solves these liquidity concerns.  To avoid duplicative 
taxation of already-taxed contributions, the state either can exclude 
from income an amount equal to such already taxed contributions or 
allow the taxpayer to claim a tax credit for taxes paid with respect to 
earlier contributions.186  Providing an exclusion leaves the taxpayers 
indifferent as to interim changes in tax rates, while the tax credit option 
leaves taxpayers at risk for payment of an additional tax (or tax benefit) 
should the tax rate change between the year in which a contribution was 
taxed and when it was distributed back to the retiree.187  Both of these 
 
184. The tax on distributions would pick up any as-yet untaxed contributions.  A variation on 
this approach would tax employees on only the income and realized gains in their retirement 
accounts, comparable to the treatment of investors in mutual funds. 
185. Withdrawals before a taxpayer reaches the age of 59.5 trigger a ten percent penalty tax in 
addition to being included in income and being subjected to income tax at ordinarily applicable 
rates.  See I.R.C. § 72(t) (2012). 
186. Of course, the taxpayer should be allowed only one opportunity to exclude a 
contribution, or claim credit for a tax payment.  For example, suppose an individual has a section 
401(k) account with a balance of $100,000, of which $20,000 was taxed (included in income) in 
the year it was contributed to the account.  If the individual takes $15,000 out of the account in 
the year immediately after retirement, the entire amount should be excluded from his taxable 
income.  However, if, in the following year, that individual takes another $15,000 out of the 
account, he should include $10,000 of that second distribution in his income. 
187. If taxpayers were granted a dollar-for-dollar credit for previously paid taxes and tax rates 
increased in the interim between the contribution and the distribution, in the year of the 
distribution, the taxpayer would have to pay the difference between the tax paid with respect to 
the contribution in the earlier year and the amount of taxes due on that amount of the distribution 
in the later year.  For example, suppose the taxpayer paid $20 of taxes with respect to a $100 
contribution in year one, and in year fifteen, a year in which he was in a twenty-five percent 
marginal tax bracket, he received that $100 back as part of a retirement distribution.  His $20 tax 
credit would offset only part of the taxes due on that distribution; he would owe an additional $5 
in tax.  Of course, if his marginal tax rate in year fifteen was fifteen percent, unless his tax credit 
was limited, he would have $5 of credits to offset taxes due on other portions of his retirement 
distribution. 
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options, though, would favor retirees who move to lower-tax states at 
retirement, as Illinois cannot impose the distribution tax on non-
residents.188  Even the annual taxation option fails to completely 
eliminate the incentive for moving to a lower tax jurisdiction, though, 
because post-move increases in value—created by post-move 
investment earnings—would escape the Illinois tax net.189 
Designing a transitional (or more than transitional) tax on 
distributions to employees covered by defined benefit plans such as the 
various Illinois state pension plans poses more difficultly, for the same 
reasons taxing contributions to such plans is more difficult.  As 
mentioned above,190 given the absence of a one-to-one correspondence 
between particular contributions and particular employees receiving 
distributions, it is hard to envision how to make such an allocation, and 
thus, how to avoid duplicative taxation of already-taxed contributions.  
It may be even harder to allocate interim increases and decreases in the 
value of the assets held by an investment trust for purposes of imposing 
a tax on yearly investment income.  And again, employers with 
operations—or even retirees—residing in many states will face 
additional implementation issues.191  Assuming such allocations can be 
made, however, recipients of distributions from these plans can be 
offered either exclusions or tax credits under rules similar to those 
devised for recipients of benefits from defined contribution plans.  
Alternatively, the distributions can be treated as annuities, with the 
already-taxed contributions and/or investment returns as the 
 
188. See supra text accompanying notes 169–70. 
189. One interesting question is whether a new state would have to grant credits or exclusions 
for amounts previously subject to tax in Illinois when levying its own tax on retirement 
distributions.  The answer is not clear.  See Klaiman, supra note 170, at 652–66 (defending the 
constitutionality of source-based pension taxation); id. at 655–56 (“[T]he constitutionality of a 
state’s tax on nonresidents does not turn on the layout of another state’s tax code . . . the existence 
or absence of tax credits in other states does not either forgive or create constitutional 
impediments for the state imposing the source tax.”); see also Hellerstein & Smith, supra note 
170, at 226 (“[S]tates generally lack the constitutional power to tax the portion of a former 
resident’s pension income that reflects accumulations after the taxpayer’s change of residence 
[and] must limit their taxation of nonresident pension income to the deferred employment income 
and the income accumulated prior to the retiree’s change of residence.”).  The absence of such an 
exclusion or credit could turn even a low tax state into a high tax state for some formerly-Illinois 
retirees—which might encourage them to stay in Illinois. 
190. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of an 
attribution or tax on nonresidents obtaining pension benefits). 
191. See Hellerstein & Smith, supra note 170, at 226–27 (“[I]t may be difficult, if not 
impossible, for a state (or for an employer with state withholding tax obligations) to determine, 
on a pension-check-by-pension-check basis, what proportion of the payment reflects deferred 
payment for serviced rendered in the state and what proportion represents investment income that 
accrued while the taxpayer was a nonresident of the state.”). 
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constructive premium; these amounts could then be recovered ratably as 
distributions are paid.192 
Though these protocols appear both elaborate and inelegant, in the 
modern world of computerized tax preparation it may turn out that their 
actual burden is less significant than it first appears.  The most difficult 
part of the process for traditional defined benefit plans—determining 
the amount contributed to those plans on behalf of Illinois employees—
will fall on sophisticated employers who already rely on actuaries in 
order to set up such a plan.  Employers can also be required to keep 
records of the contributions they make to defined contribution plans, so 
well as of any employee contributions made to obtain employer 
matches.  Individual taxpayers will need only to compile the amount of 
their contributions to their IRAs.  The state could make this record-
keeping easier by adding a line to tax returns requiring taxpayers to 
report their accrued contributions to such accounts; taxpayers could 
determine the number by pulling the previous year’s total from last 
year’s return and adding current-year contributions. 
That said, it undoubtedly would be simpler merely to include 
retirement income in taxable income in full in the year it is received, as 
long as every other state does the same.  It avoids the possibility of 
retirement income being subjected to two sets of state income taxes—
Illinois’ on the basis of source, and some other state on the basis of 
residence if the retiree has moved states prior to receiving the pension 
distribution.193  Inasmuch as it is unclear whether substantial numbers 
of taxpayers really will move to other states to avoid taxation of 
retirement income,194 taxing only distributions may be the preferable 
alternative.  Even if Congress could be persuaded to revoke Public Law 
104-95,195 the statute forbidding states from taxing the retirement 
income of nonresidents on the basis of source, some of the technical 
issues described above would arise whenever employees received 
retirement benefits from pension arrangements derived from 
 
192. The excludable fraction of the benefit would equal a fraction the numerator of which 
would be the amount of taxed contributions and the denominator of which would be the expected 
benefits payable under the plan.  See I.R.C. § 79 (2012) (outlining rules for excluding portion of 
annuity payments attributable to return of already-taxed premium payments).  This treatment is 
somewhat less favorable than the exclusion described earlier, because it defers some of the 
exclusion to later taxable periods. 
193. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing the sourced-based pension 
taxation).  It is unclear, of course, whether Illinois ought to care about such people. 
194. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (claiming that state taxes have only a small 
effect, if any at all, on whether individuals move to or from the state). 
195. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (describing the federal statute that prohibits 
states from taxing retirement income of non-residents). 
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employment in other states.  Pensions paid directly by employers under 
the terms of defined benefit plans for services performed wholly within 
Illinois might be sourced to, and thus taxable by, the state of Illinois,196 
but distributions from defined contribution plans might have to be 
allocated between Illinois and any new residence state.  The issue of 
pro-ration also would arise if an individual receives taxable social 
security benefits, particularly if that individual worked in a state other 
than Illinois for part of his or her career.  Recent (and future) changes in 
pension configurations make Public Law 104-95 seem more defensible 
than when it was first enacted, as the investment component of 
withdrawals from defined contribution plans, and thus the need for 
complicated source allocations, becomes more obvious. 
Taxing retirement benefits raises tax revenues, but it is not the only 
way to deal with retirement costs.  Another much simpler—but perhaps 
altogether too obvious—alternative is to reduce retirement costs by 
reducing the cash salaries (and especially cash salaries earned in the 
immediate pre-retirement years) of state employees.  This alternative is 
explained in greater detail in the next Part. 
III.  EXPLOITING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CASH SALARIES 
AND RETIREMENT PAYMENTS 
The pension plans maintained by the state of Illinois are what is 
known as “final pay” plans.  Pension distributions are keyed to the 
amount of cash salary received by an employee in his or her last years 
of service.197  The lower the cash salary during those years of service, 
the lower the retirement benefit.  Holding the line on salary increases—
or even reducing cash salaries—would both free up cash that can be 
used to pay down the accrued indebtedness of the pension system and 
reduce the amount of future accruals. 
If, as some contend, state employees were “overpaid,”198 across-the-
 
196. But see Hellerstein & Smith, supra note 170, at 226 (“The fact that pension payments 
include deferred compensation components and investment income components creates a serious 
practical complication in state taxation of nonresident pension income.”). 
197. Prior to 2011, the base for calculating annuities was the average of the employee’s salary 
during his of her four highest paid consecutive years of service during his or her last ten years of 
employment.  In 2011, the rule was changed for newly hired employees to the average of the 
highest eight years of the last ten, with a $106,800 cap (adjusted for inflation, the cap is now 
$110,631).  Topinka, supra note 48, at 6 (Tier 1 versus Tier 2 Benefits).  The recently passed 
reform ostensibly imposes that cap on all non-retired employees whose income currently falls 
below the cap; the cap for current employees is the greater of the new cap or their income in the 
year the reform bill becomes effective.  The terms of this salary cap accord with federal standards 
of retroactivity, but not the anti-forfeiture limits previously imposed by Illinois state courts. 
198. I express no opinion on this much-disputed issue.  See supra note 122 and accompanying 
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board pay restrictions or pay cuts would be warranted.  Whether they 
would be achievable is another matter entirely.  Not only do the state 
employee unions have statewide political power, but they also have 
effective control over their own members and would undoubtedly 
engage in some adverse job action, up to and possibly including a 
strike.199  Which side would prevail in a labor dispute is unclear, but a 
serious disruption in the delivery of public services undoubtedly would 
have deleterious effects on the political and economic climate in 
Illinois. 
A more realistic possibility may be to reduce or eliminate a variety of 
work rule and compensation practices that allow employees to “spike” 
their salaries in the year leading up to their retirement.  Illinois can 
change work rules in ways that adversely affect retirement benefits 
without running afoul of the Pension Protection Clause.  In Peters v. 
City of Springfield,200 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the city 
was entitled to adopt an ordinance reducing the mandatory retirement 
age of firefighters from sixty-three to sixty, even though that reduction 
had the effect of preventing some firefighters from qualifying for the 
maximum possible pension under Illinois law.  The court reasoned that 
“a right to work until a specified age is not a pension benefit”201 and 
intimated that other changes in the terms of employment would also be 
acceptable, even though the changes “might affect the pensions which 
plaintiffs would ultimately” receive.202  There are several changes that 
could be made that would have the effect of reducing some of the most 
scandalous abuses of the Illinois pension system. 
One obvious target would be late-career salary spikes that boost 
pensions.203  Although Illinois passed a law in 2011 limiting the extent 
 
text (elaborating on the issue of overpaid state employees while avoiding any specific stance on 
the topic). 
199. The union representing Illinois state workers threatened to go out on strike when contract 
negotiations stalemated in 2013.  See Christine Byers, Illinois State Workers’ Union Talking 
About Strike, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 24, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/new/ 
local/govt-and-politics/illinois-state-workers-union-talking-about-strike/article_8fe223a3-ef4e-5e 
95-ab50-b3a20c6f9041.htm (“[U]nion leaders say they’re seriously considering the prospect [of a 
strike] as contract talks have stalemated . . . .”).  The parties agreed on a new contract before a 
strike was called. 
200. Peters v. City of Springfield, 311 N.E.2d 107 (Ill. 1974). 
201. Id. at 151. 
202. Id. (“Municipal employment is not static and a number of factors might require that a 
public position be abolished, its functions changed, or the terms of employment modified.”). 
203. See, e.g., Joseph Ryan & Joe Mahr, Retirement Perks Cost Towns Millions, CHI. TRIB., 
Sept. 17, 2010, at 1.1 (recounting examples of retirement perks); Steve Schmadeke, Police and 
Fire Pensions Get Padded Despite Illinois’ Pension Deficit Crisis, CHI. TRIB., July 16, 2010, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-16/opinion/ct-met-pension-deals-20100716_1_police-
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to which such spikes can be included in the base for determining an 
employee’s pension, the limitation applies only to employees hired after 
the legislation’s date of enactment, because it constituted a change in 
the pension formula.204  For this sort of reform to have an effect in 
fewer than twenty years, it must take the form of an across-the-board 
limitation on salary increases, not pension increases.  A salary 
limitation, unlike a change in the rules for computing pension payments, 
would count as a permissible change in “terms of employment.”205  For 
example, Illinois could forbid the payment of all bonuses or limit pay 
increases for individual employees to 1.5 times the average increase of 
all employees in their employment unit.206  Such a change could have 
deleterious consequences in some situations—it could, for example, 
make it more difficult to retain an employee who receives a more 
lucrative offer of employment elsewhere—but the benefits in terms of 
reducing abusive behavior207 may well outweigh those costs. 
Another useful change would be to limit employees’ ability to cash 
out of unused vacation and sick days.  Such payments have also been 
used to “spike” final year salaries and to extend the term of covered 
service.208  Current employees209 will have to be allowed to use their 
 
pension-illinois-pension-final-salaries/2 (recounting pay raises in Chicago Ridge, Willow 
Springs, Westchester, and other towns). 
204. Op-ed, The Pension Spike Survives, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 2013, at 1.18; Ray Long, Bill 
Limits Late-Career Pension Increases, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 2011, at 1.4. 
205. Although no Illinois court seems to have directly ruled on this issue in the pension 
context, the Supreme Court of Illinois relied on precedent from New York when deciding Peters 
v. City of Springfield, 311 N.E.2d 107 (Ill. 1974), because “a similar provision is contained in the 
Constitution of New York and has been construed by the courts of that State.”  Id. at 151; see 
Hoar v. Yonders, 67 N.E.2d 157, 159 (N.Y. 1946) (“We find nothing in the text of article V, 
section 7, of the Constitution or in any State statute or local law which withholds from the 
appropriate official body of the City of Yonkers the power to reduce or increase the compensation 
which the plaintiff shall receive and which serves as the basis for computing his pension rights.”).  
Peters itself seems to equate salary with length of service (which it held could be diminished 
through a lowering of the retirement age) without running afoul of the Pension Protection Clause.  
See Peters, 311 N.E.2d at 151 (“The firemen’s pension fund formula is based on salary and 
length of service and obviously any change in these variables will affect the amount of the 
pension. . . .  [A] number of factors might require that a public position be abolished, its functions 
changed, or the terms of employment modified.”). 
206. The restriction would have to apply to all employees in a unit, rather than employees on 
the cusp of retirement, not only to avoid the possibility of its being deemed a cutback of pension 
benefits but also to avoid being struck down as a violation of the federal Age Discrimination Act. 
207. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (describing articles detailing situations in 
which insiders granted other insiders last-minute salary increases to boost retirement annuities). 
208. See Schmadeke, supra note 203 (recounting examples of retirement perks). 
209. The Pension Reform Act already prevents employees hired after its effective date from 
using sick or vacation time towards pensionable salary or years of service.  See 40 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/7-114(a) (2012); id. at 5/7-116(d)(7); id. at 5/7-139(a)(8); id. at 5/9-220(a)(5). 
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accumulated vacation and sick days to extend their term of service, as 
their right to do so is part of the Pension Code and is thus protected 
against impairment or distribution, but steps can be taken to reduce their 
ability to accumulate additional days in future years.  For example, the 
terms of the employment contracts may be changed to prevent the 
accumulation of vacation (and sick) days for more than a four- or five-
year period, reducing the number of such days that would be available 
to provide additional retirement credits when employees neared 
retirement age.210  Such days could be provided under a “use it or lose 
it” system, much like the system applicable to health benefit accounts in 
cafeteria plans; employees would be allowed to use those days within 
four or five years of when earned, or they would disappear. 
Such a change would be justifiable from a policy perspective.  The 
rationale for granting sick days, for example, is to encourage sick 
employees to stay home to recover and to avoid infecting co-workers.211  
Treating such days as indistinguishable from vacation days undermines 
that purpose and provides employees with a financial incentive to come 
to work when sick, as every sick day they do not use shows up as a day 
of compensated leisure at the end of their career.  Likewise, the 
justification for vacation days presumably is to allow employees to 
avoid burning out from excess work; that purpose is not served if they 
fail to use the days until after their period of employment has ended.  
Again, these changes would be to terms of service, not strictly speaking 
the formula for calculating pension benefits, and should be allowable 
and effective under Peters. 
Finally, limits can be placed on the amount of overtime any one 
employee can accumulate in a given year.  Again, this may create some 
inconvenience or unhappiness, as it may lead to either less flexibility in 
the provision of services and to some mismatch between employees 
 
210. Currently, this use is ubiquitous.  See Op-Ed, Sick, Sick, Sick, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 2012, at 
1.18 (“More than 300 CPS principals and administrators each grabbed more than $100,000, 
cashing out unused sick days and vacation days, from 2006 to 2011 . . . [while] members of the 
Teachers Retirement System . . . allowed to accumulate as many as 340 uncompensated sick days 
for up to two years of credit . . . .  That allows those teachers to retire two years early with full 
pension benefits.”). 
211. See, e.g., Joyce Rosenberg, Businesses Are Split on Issue of Paid Sick Time, SPOKESMAN 
REV., Apr. 7, 2013, at E-1 (stating that supporters of paid sick leave argue it “encourages 
employees to stay home instead of coming to work and infecting everyone around them”); 
Leaders Push for Earned-Sick-Time Benefits at Hearing, THE LOWELL SUN (Sept. 25, 2013, 6:37 
AM), http://www.lowellsun.com/news/ci_24171078/leaders-push-earned-sick-time-benefits-at-he 
aring (“Dr. Anita Barry, director of the City of Boston’s Infections Disease Bureau, said not 
guaranteeing paid sick leave runs counter to the advice public officials give flu patients and others 
infected with contagious diseases to stay at home to avoid the spread of infection.  ‘I would plead 
with you for the sake of public health to please pass this bill’ . . . .”). 
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who have to perform overtime and those who want to perform overtime.  
But controlling overtime can prevent excessive amounts from appearing 
in a worker’s salary in the years in which salary is used as the basis for 
determining his or her pension. 
These modest and dull measures can be applied to current employees 
in an effort to hold down—and rationalize—their pension costs.  But 
these changes, like the inclusion of retirement benefits in the income tax 
base, are both too small and (perhaps) too unlikely to be adopted to 
provide anything close to a full solution to the Illinois pension crisis for 
current employees, let alone provide a solution for how to structure the 
employment contracts of future employees.  While some state 
governments can successfully operate defined benefit pension plans, it 
is clear that Illinois’ government is too dysfunctional to exercise the 
fiscal discipline necessary to operate such a plan.  Its plans have always 
been grossly underfunded; indeed, a major impetus for the state 
constitution’s Pension Protection Clause was the then current 
underfunding of the plans.212  Moreover, the clause was only adopted 
after its supporters assured other members of the Constitutional 
Convention that it did not require that the affected pension plans be 
funded in advance.213  But as the citizens of Illinois (and other states 
and localities) are learning, whether funded in advance or deferred until 
pension benefits have to be paid out, pension obligations require the use 
of funds that could otherwise be spent on providing desired (and even 
necessary) services.  Pushing payment into the future does not lessen 
the pain, it breeds misconceptions about the cost of providing 
government services, and it interferes with the development of 
budgetary and political discipline.  But how can Illinois get out of the 
defined benefit business without placing the retirement security of its 
employees at risk?  That is the subject of the following Part. 
IV.  THE ALLURE OF JOINING THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 
The appeal to politicians of underfunding pension promises—like 
other forms of government debt—is obvious.  They can claim credit for 
providing government services without raising taxes.  That taxes will 
 
212. See Shields, supra note 48 (“In 1970, the state’s unfunded liabilities were $2.5 billion 
and the [retirement] system just 41.8% funded.”). 
213. See People ex rel. Ill. Fed’n of Teachers v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749, 752 (Ill. 1975) 
(citing 4 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 2893, 2929 
(1972)) (responding to a question, Delegate Kinney stated: “[The Pension Protection Clause] was 
not intended to require 100 per cent funding or 50 per cent or 30 per cent funding or get into any 
of those problems, aside from the very slim area where a court might judicially determine that 
imminent bankruptcy would really be impairment”). 
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have to be raised, or some other sources of government revenue found, 
to pay off the debt might not matter to politicians at all, so long as the 
unpleasantness can be deferred to a time period beyond their term of 
office.  The short-sighted behavior of politicians is sometimes matched 
by the long-sighted behavior of unions, which understand that it can be 
easier to gain pay increases in the form of pension benefits than higher 
salaries, which require the outlay of current dollars funded either 
through immediate tax increases or more obvious forms of 
indebtedness.214  The resulting moral hazard, argues at least one 
academic, Maria O’Brien Hylton, is grounds for eliminating the defined 
benefit pension plan as an option for government employers.215  Most 
private employers have already switched to defined contribution 
plans,216 and governmental entities should follow suit, it is argued,217 at 
least to the extent legally permissible.218 
However, there is a difference between employees of private 
companies and employees of state and local governments.  Employees 
of private companies are covered by social security, which provides 
them with a backstop against destitution.219  A quarter of state and local 
 
214. In fairness to the unions representing Illinois state employees, it should be pointed out 
that they tried over the years to force the Illinois state government to fully fund its pension 
promises, which would have brought the cost of these promises to public attention.  However, the 
courts have held that the Pension Protection Clause did not provide them with grounds for such a 
suit.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text (listing cases). 
215. Maria O’Brien Hylton, Combating Moral Hazard: The Case for Rationalizing Public 
Employee Benefits, 45 IND. L. REV. 413, 464 (2012) (“[I]t combats the moral hazard problem 
directly.”). 
216. BARBARA A. BUTRICA & NADIA S. KARAMCHEVA, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH 
AT B.C., AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT, EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION, AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 2 
(2012), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/wp_2012-25-508.pdf 
(“Between 1989 and 2012, the proportion of private industry full-time workers participating in 
DB pension plans declined from 42 to 20 percent, while the share participating in DC plans 
increased from 40 to 51 percent . . . .”); FAQs About Benefits—Retirement Issues, EMP. BENEFIT 
RESEARCH INST., http://www.ebri.org/publications/benfaq/index.cfm?fa=retfaq14 (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2015) (discussing that in 2011, thirty-one percent of all private-sector workers 
participated only in a defined contribution plan and three percent participated only in a defined 
benefit pension plan; eleven percent had both a defined benefit and defined contribution plan). 
217. Hylton, supra note 215, at 482 (“[T]he elimination of DB plans in favor of DC plans . . . 
may be the only viable solution[].”). 
218. In Illinois, of course, that would mean new employees would be restricted to such plans.  
The recently enacted pension reform bill provides a limited opportunity for a small number of 
employees to voluntarily elect into such a defined contribution alternative.  See 40 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/14-155 (2014) (explaining the voluntary defined contribution plan). 
219. See Policy Basics: Top Ten Facts About Social Security, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3261 (last updated Nov. 6, 2012) (“[F]or 
most workers, Social Security will be their only source of guaranteed retirement income that is 
not subject to investment risk or financial market fluctuations . . . helping to ensure that people do 
not fall into poverty as they age. . . .  Social Security provides a foundation of retirement 
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government employees, by contrast, including most employees of state 
(and local) governments in Illinois, are not so covered.220  The absence 
of social security coverage renders the well-known flaws of defined 
contribution plans more critical.  Thus, governments should be required 
to opt-in to the social security system for any employees relegated to 
defined contribution plans.221  This requirement would not compromise 
the fiscal discipline states and localities need,222 as social security 
requires employers and employees to make regular payments to the 
system, while protecting the financial interests of state and local 
employees. 
An additional advantage of mandating the extension of social security 
 
protection for people at all earnings levels.”); see also Munnell & Muldoon, supra note 157, at 5 
(“Social Security is an extremely valuable source of retirement income.  It is payable for life and 
benefits are adjusted to keep pace with inflation.”); April Yanyuan Wu et al., How Does Women 
Working Affect Social Security Replacement Rates?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT B.C., 
June 2013, at 3–4, (showing social security replacement rate declining from forty-five to thirty-
nine percent of preretirement wages). 
220. David Dayen, Robbing Illinois’s Public Employees, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 9, 2013), 
http://prospect.org/article/robbing-illinoiss-public-employees (“80 percent of state workers 
affected [by the pension reforms] do not participate in Social Security . . . .”); see Illinois Public 
Employee Retirement Systems, ILL. RETIREMENT SEC. INITIATIVE 1–2 (2009) (describing various 
Illinois pension plans and integration or lack thereof with social security). 
221. One question is whether such a mandate would be constitutional.  In 1990, Congress 
mandated the inclusion in social security of all state and local employees not otherwise covered 
by retirement plans, but this act was never challenged in court and at least one commentator 
believes that “[t]he constitutional issues involved have not been fully resolved.”  ALICIA H. 
MUNNELL, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT B.C., MANDATORY SOCIAL SECURITY 
COVERAGE OF STATE AND LOCAL WORKERS: A PERENNIAL HOT BUTTON 6 n.3 (2005), 
available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2005/06/ib_32_508.pdf.  Others disagree.  E.g., 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING 
MANDATORY COVERAGE TO STATE AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES (1998), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-HEHS-98-196/html/GAOREPORTS-HEHS-98-1 
96.htm (“GAO believes that mandatory coverage is likely to be upheld under current Supreme 
Court decisions . . . .”).  Certainly Congress’ authority to mandate such action under the 
Commerce Clause seems more likely when the applicable precedent is Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985) (upholding 
application of the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
against the states), than it was when the precedent was National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 
U.S. 833 (1976) (holding the opposite of the Garcia court), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).  The State of Illinois may find itself with standing 
to challenge a portion of the current social security mandate around 2027, when some experts 
believe that the retirement benefits payable to Tier 2 employees—those hired after 2011—will 
start falling below federal minimum standards.  See Bob Secter & Kim Geiger, Experts: Pension 
Fix Could Backfire, Reductions May Not Meet Federal Standards by 2027, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 
2015, at 1.4 (describing possible impact of the “Safe Harbor Act”). 
222. See Hylton, supra note 215, at 464 (arguing that the DC arrangements “forc[ing] 
legislat[ures] to budget now for contributions that will be made in the very near future . . . 
impose[] precisely the kind of fiscal discipline that has been missing in the public sector for 
decades”). 
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coverage to state (and local) employees is that it would remove any 
justification for the continuation of pension rules that leave room for 
abusive behavior and that, thus far, have remained impervious to 
various Illinois reform proposals.  For example, Illinois law allows 
some employees to “buy” years of service credit towards state pensions 
for amounts far below the costs those years of “service” impose on the 
system.223  Some employees remain able to “double dip”—changing 
jobs when hitting the maximum benefit accrual under one retirement 
plan in order to begin accruing benefits under another plan.224  These 
opportunities stem from pension rules enacted to counterbalance the 
adverse effects of the non-portability of traditionally structured defined 
benefit plans on short-term employees.  Rapid accruals of maximum 
benefit percentages protect workers against the possibility of excessive 
benefit loss through involuntary job loss, but leave open possibilities for 
double dipping.  Social security, by contrast, is completely portable 
across all U.S. jobs (except some state and local government jobs) and 
offers few, if any, opportunities to “game” the system to duplicate 
pension coverage.225 
 
223. E.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/20-118 (2012) (allowing employees to reinstate service 
credit by repaying refunds of previously distributed contributions); Jason Grotto, How Daley 
Fattened Pension, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2012, at 1.1 (describing misuse of pension plan); Ray 
Long, $100K Pension for Ex-Teachers Union Lobbyist, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 2012, at 1.1 
(describing abusive buy in arrangements); Retirement Systems Reciprocal Act, RET. SYS. 
RECIPROCAL CONFERENCE (2015), https://www.srs.illinois.gov/PDFILES/brochures/recip.pdf  
(describing benefits of service credit purchase option); State Universities Retirement System, S. 
ILL. U., http://policies.siu.edu/employees_handbook/chapter8/surs.html (last visited Apr. 26, 
2015) (“In addition, it may be possible to purchase service credit.  This is true for prior 
employment (half-time or more, including student work and graduate assistantships) at an Illinois 
employer covered by SURS and/or for employment with a previous public employer.”).  Illinois 
is not the only state with this problem.  See Beermann, supra note 4, at 22–24 (addressing 
examples from other states). 
224. See, e.g., A Model for Good Government, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 8, 2013, at 17 (providing 
examples of double-dipping); Brian Costin, Naperville Considers Pension Double-Dipping 
Transparency Reform, ILL. POL’Y (Nov. 4, 2013), http://ipweb-lb-1885590254.us-east-1.elb.amaz 
onaws.com/naperville-considers-pension-double-dipping-transparency-reform/ (“[S]ome workers 
don’t just get one pension—they get two or three.”); John Gregory, Illinois Lawmaker Aims to 
Stop Pension ‘Double-dipping,’ WJBC (Nov. 15, 2013, 7:19 AM), http://www.wjbc.com/commo 
n/page.php?feed=21&pt=Illinois+lawmaker+aims+to+stop+pension+%27double-dipping%27&i 
d=96343&is_corp= (listing examples); Dave Savini, Some University Employees Double Dipping 
for State Paychecks, CBS CHI. (Feb. 8, 2012, 10:00 PM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/ 
02/08/some-university-employees-double-dipping-for-state-paychecks/ (stating that university 
employees are “retiring” and then are re-hired to perform same job). 
225. Indeed, federal law prevents state and local government employees from “double 
dipping” with respect to social security benefits.  Some government employees work part-time 
jobs in the private sector or after taking advantage of the early-retirement ages set under state and 
local governmental retirement plans to work enough quarters at jobs covered by social security to 
entitle them to pensions from both sources.  Because of the way social security benefits are 
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In theory, defined contribution plans can provide employees with the 
financial security of a defined benefit plan, but, in practice, few workers 
seem capable of the self-discipline and investment acumen necessary to 
achieve this result.226  Defined contribution plans offer many more 
options to employees than do defined benefit plans.  For example, they 
allow employees to choose how much pay to invest in the plan,227 and 
whether to leave the money so invested there until retirement.228  
 
figured (averaging thirty years of covered salaries, but with a minimum), these employees became 
entitled to social security benefits designed for long-term, low wage employees (approximately 
ninety-percent of that average wage) in addition to their generous state or local pensions.  In 
1983, Congress passed the Windfall Elimination Provision, Pub. L. 98-21, which reduces the 
factor by which average wages are multiplied to determine social security benefits for workers 
who have spent a minimum number of years in non-covered employment.  CHRISTINE SCOTT, 
SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WINDFALL ELIMINATION PROVISION (WEP) 1–3 (2013), available at 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-35.pdf.  This disallowance affects all such employees who have 
spent fewer than thirty years in social security eligible employment.  Id. at 3.  Some modification 
of the Windfall Elimination Provision, such as pro-rating the disallowance percentage according 
to the years of social security coverage, would be warranted in the event Congress mandated 
immediate inclusion of state and local government employees in the social security system. 
226. See BARBARA A BUTRICA & KAREN E. SMITH, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT 
B.C., 401(K) PARTICIPANT BEHAVIOR IN A VOLATILE ECONOMY 3 (2012), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/wp_2012-24-5081.pdf (“But recent studies have revealed less than 
encouraging information about retirees’ ability to adequately plan for retirement.  While DC plans 
have the potential to provide retirees with substantial retirement wealth, a typical household 
approaching retirement had 410(k)/IRA balances of only $42,000 in 2010.” (citation omitted)). 
227. Typically, employees fail to elect to put aside enough money into defined contribution 
plans.  See Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension 
System?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 305, 311–12 (2007) (describing extent of failures to 
participate and to make sufficient contributions to 401(k) plans).  “According to one estimate, ‘a 
participant earning $50,000 per year and covered only by a defined contribution plan would need 
to save fifteen percent of income . . . over thirty years to ensure adequate retirement savings.’  Yet 
the average estimate is less than half of that rate.”  Id. at 312 (footnote omitted).  These 
pessimistic statistics have led scholars to develop (and many employers to implement) strategies 
aimed at nudging participation and contributions levels upward.  See James J. Choi et al., Defined 
Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance, in 16 
TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 67, 98–99 (James M. Poterba ed., 2002) (encouraging 
employers to choose default rules which will lead to optimal behavior); Butrica & Karamcheva, 
supra note 216, at 3 (citing studies suggesting that automatic enrollment “has succeeded in 
dramatically increasing 401(k) participation”). 
228. Many defined contribution plans allow employees to withdraw the money in their 
retirement accounts prior to reaching retirement age, albeit subject to a tax penalty, and numerous 
employees imperil their retirement security by taking advantage of this option.  Ron Lieber, 
Combating a Flood of Early 401(k) Withdrawals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2014, at B1 (“Over a 
quarter of households that use one of these plans take out money for purposes other than 
retirement expenses at some point. . . .  [I]ndustry veterans tend to refer to these retirement 
withdrawals as ‘leakage.’  But . . . it’s really more like a breach.”); Alicia H. Munnell et al., An 
Update on 401(k) Plans: Insights From the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances 8–9 (Ctr. for Ret. 
Research at B.C., Working Paper No. 2009-26), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/upload 
s/2009/11/wp_2009-26-508.pdf (“To discourage cashing out, the federal government has imposed 
a 10 percent penalty in addition to regular income taxes on any withdrawal before age 59 ½. . . .  
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Employees are also responsible for choosing where the accumulated 
funds will be invested,229 and bear the financial risk attendant on those 
investment choices.230  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, most 
defined benefit plans pay lifelong annuities, ensuring that no covered 
employee outlives his or her retirement income.  Although an annuity 
might be one of the options offered to participants in defined 
contribution plans, employees can (and often do) opt under these plans 
for lump-sum distributions of their account balances, “creating concern 
about post-distribution conservation of savings.”231 
These flaws are less serious—and may be outweighed by the benefits 
of the fiscal discipline imposed by their use—when defined contribution 
plans are secondary plans, provided in addition to a guaranteed 
retirement annuity that is adjusted for inflation.  Private workers have 
such an annuity provided by the social security system.  Many 
government workers—and particularly Illinois workers—do not. 
There is something counterintuitive about advocating the movement 
of state and local government employees from one set of governmental 
defined benefit plans to another such plan.  After all, the federal 
government is subject to the same pressures that led to the underfunding 
of state and local pension plans.  And the federal government seems to 
have wildly underfunded some aspects of the protections it has 
promised to provide seniors, in particular Medicare.232  However, 
because of its wider scope, the social security system is more closely 
 
40 percent of participants who received a lump sum did not roll the money over into another tax-
deferred savings vehicle.”). 
229. Stabile, supra note 227, at 312 (“401(k) plans . . . put[] investment decisions in the hands 
of employees.”).  Unfortunately, many employees lack the knowledge to make intelligent 
investment choices.  Id.  “Many, if not most, employees lack the knowledge to make the 
necessary financial decisions.”  Id. at 313.  It is unclear how to convey the necessary knowledge 
to them.  Id. at 319 (“There is little to suggest that education would have very positive effects; 
employees simply do not seem to hear the messages education attempts to convey. . . .  I have 
argued elsewhere that education is unlikely to be effective in addressing the cognitive biases that 
influence participant investment decisions.” (footnotes omitted)); William G. Gale & Ruth 
Levine, Financial Literacy: What Works? How Could It Be More Effective? 3 (Fin. Sec. Project 
at B.C., Working Paper No. 2011-1), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 
03/FSP-2011-1.pdf (“None of the four traditional approaches has generated unambiguous 
evidence that financial literacy efforts have had positive and substantial impacts.”). 
230. Stabile, supra note 227, at 312. 
231. Id. at 315. 
232. For example, in 2014 alone, “the projected difference between Social Security’s 
expenditures and dedicated tax income is $80 billion.  For [Medicare Hospital Insurance], the 
projected difference between expenditures and dedicated tax and premium income is $25 billion.  
The projected general revenue demands of [Medicare Parts B and D] are $248 billion.”  Soc. Sec. 
& Medicare Bds. of Trs., A Summary of the 2014 Annual Reports, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2015) (footnote omitted). 
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regulated and monitored than most state systems, and certainly more so 
than the system Illinois maintains.  Nor is its benefit formula, which is 
based on lifetime earnings, subject to the sort of abusive manipulation 
that seems to be typical of state systems.233  Moreover, both the formula 
and the contribution rates are subject to periodic revisions that take into 
account changes in economic and social conditions.234 
Ultimately, of course, no pension system is perfectly safe in the face 
of economic or political devastation.  However, such dire circumstances 
are less likely to arise at the national than at the state level.  Just as 
importantly, state (and local) employees will have more political 
protection against being singled out for concessions in such a situation 
if their economic fate is tied to all other retirees than if they are in a 
class by themselves, the beneficiaries of (perhaps) especially favorable 
retirement rules. 
Social security need not, and should not, be the only source of 
retirement income for Illinois employees, any more than it is the only 
source of retirement income for many private retirees.  It was not 
designed to be the sole source of retirement income;235 its average 
“replacement rate” of pre-retirement income falls short of that necessary 
to enable beneficiaries to fully finance a lifestyle equivalent to their pre-
retirement lifestyle.236  Social security benefits should be topped up by 
benefits provided under a defined contribution plan, funded by some 
combination of employee and employer contributions.  As noted above, 
that pattern would be consistent with trends in the private sector.  Social 
 
233. SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., SEE YOUR RETIREMENT BENEFIT: HOW IT’S FIGURED (2015), 
available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10070.pdf (explaining retirement benefit 
calculations).  Short-term earning increases, for example, have little effect on the amount of a 
retiree’s annuity, eliminating the benefit of pre-retirement “earning spikes.”  No formula is 
perfect, of course, and many have found certain elements of the social security benefit formula 
problematic—even elements specifically desired by Congress.  See William Baldwin, 11 Ways 
Your Social Security Benefit Calculation Can Shortchange You, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2014, 5:17 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/baldwin/2014/01/07/11-ways-your-social-security-benefit-calculatio 
n-can-shortchange-you/ (describing alleged flaws in benefit calculation). 
234. It is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court of Illinois would find that changes in social 
security rules violate the Pension Protection Clause and thus require additional state funding to 
make up losses to adversely affected employees.  Not only would changes not be due to actions 
taken by state officials, but also, the promise made by the state to its employees could be 
interpreted as merely obligating it to continue participating in the social security system, rather 
than to a particular quantum of benefits under the system. 
235. Andrew G. Biggs & Glenn R. Springstead, Alternate Measures of Replacement Rates for 
Social Security Benefits and Retirement Income, 68 SOC. SEC. BULL. 1, 3 (2008) (“Social 
Security was not designed to be the sole source of retirement income.”). 
236. Id. (stating that “conventional wisdom” is that social security replaces about forty percent 
of the average worker’s pre-retirement earnings and that such workers need seventy percent or 
more to continue their pre-retirement lifestyle). 
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security can, and should, be a floor rather than a ceiling on retirement 
benefits.  The goal is to provide a combination of adequate retirement 
support and transparent retirement costs.  Such transparency would lead 
to a meaningful conversation about the reasonableness of the overall 
compensation package of public employees (not to mention the 
reasonableness of the size of the public sector).  Such a conversation is 
impossible when the costs of a large component of that compensation 
are effectively hidden. 
V.  GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE 
As detailed above, under the Supreme Court of Illinois’ likely 
interpretation of the Illinois Constitution, even if the Illinois state 
legislature agreed to shift from its state-defined benefit pension plan to 
participation in social security, or some combination of social security 
and a defined contribution plan, the shift could affect only newly hired 
employees.  Current employees would have to remain under the current 
system.  They may well prefer that outcome, though of course it would 
depend on the trade-off between current compensation and pension 
benefits.  If state politics and state budget constraints together result 
either in massive job losses among state employees or significant 
reductions in cash salaries, even current state employees may decide 
that the state constitution’s protection of pension benefits provides less 
protection than they imagined, and that they would be better off trading 
it for some combination of social security and defined contribution plan 
eligibility and cash salary.237  The question is how, if it is deemed 
desirable, one can move towards this goal in fewer than two 
generations. 
One option would involve amending the Pension Protection 
Clause.238  The Clause could be amended to protect only accrued 
 
237. There is no constitutional bar to a voluntary exchange of a salary package containing 
higher cash salaries and lower (or different) pension arrangements with one providing a lower 
cash salary and the current pension arrangement.  It is the unilateral imposition of a new pension 
arrangement that creates legal issues.  Eric M. Madiar, Public Pension Benefits Under Siege: 
Does State Law Facilitate or Block Recent Efforts to Cut the Pension Benefits of Public 
Servants?, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 179, 182 (2012). 
238. Amending the Illinois Constitution is not easy.  The procedure set out in Article XIV, 
Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution is a two-step process.  First, the amendment must be passed 
by a three-fifths vote of “the members elected to each house.”  Then the amendment must be 
submitted to “the electors at the general election next occurring at least six months after such 
legislative approval”; an amendment becomes effective only if approved “by either three-fifths of 
those voting on the question or a majority of those voting in the election.”  This burden is not 
insuperable.  Eleven amendments have been adopted since the constitution went into force in 
July, 1971, with the last such amendment in 2010. 
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pension benefits, consistent with the federal standard set by ERISA.239  
However, although such a constitutional change would grant the state 
the flexibility to make changes to the pension benefit packages of new 
employees, such an amendment may not allow changes to be made to 
the pension benefits of current employees, even the benefits earned 
through the future performance of personal services.  A constitutional 
amendment would not necessarily enable the state to force current 
employees to shift from their current pension plans to a combination of 
social security and defined contribution plan coverage. 
There is little doubt that such a constitutional change could overcome 
challenges made under the Illinois Constitution under the later in time 
rule.  Pension changes enacted by the legislature after the effective date 
of a state constitutional amendment would be permissible despite the 
existence of bars against governmental takings240 and governmental 
impairments of contracts241 found in the Illinois Constitution, because 
any reasonably drafted amendment would be interpreted as implicitly 
(or explicitly) amending any prior, conflicting constitutional 
provisions.242 
However, that might not be enough to allow the State to reduce future 
pension accruals of existing employees.  Such changes could still be 
considered to constitute breaches of the employees’ contracts, which 
would generate damage awards that would eliminate any savings from 
the changed pension arrangements, and, less likely, to be violations of 
the Takings243 or Contracts Clauses244 found in the federal Bill of 
Rights. 
Doctrinally, the question would be whether, because of the existence 
of the Pension Protection Clause, the pre-2013 pension provisions 
would be construed as having created “unilateral contracts” which were 
 
239. It is possible that it could be changed retroactively as well.  See supra note 46 and 
accompanying text (discussion of Contracts and Takings Clause limitations on pension 
reductions). 
240. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use 
without compensation as provided by law.  Such compensation shall be determined by a jury as 
provided by law.”). 
241. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of 
contracts or making an irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed.”). 
242. Ultimately, the interpretation of the amendment would lie in the province of the Supreme 
Court of Illinois, and a court hostile to the amendment might come up with a narrower 
interpretation of its scope.  Presumably, clear drafting of the amendment would reduce the 
likelihood of this outcome. 
243. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  As discussed supra note 46, the Takings Clause claim largely 
follows the Contracts Clause claim; hence, the following discussion concentrates on the Contracts 
Clause issues. 
244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
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accepted by employees upon starting employment with the state, and 
whether the terms of those contracts provide employees the right to 
continue to earn benefits under the formula established at the time they 
entered into the contract for the duration of their employment with the 
state.  In short, the question would be whether the state intended, when 
it hired state employees, to bind itself to providing employees with 
undiminished opportunities to earn retirement benefits over their entire 
career, or whether it intended some lesser standard of protection. 
As discussed earlier, the language of the Pension Benefit Clause is 
sufficiently ambiguous that the Supreme Court of Illinois could, if it so 
desired, interpret it to protect only already-accrued benefits.  The 
judicial interpretations of the Pension Benefit Clause described in Part 
I.B of this Article suggest quite strongly, however, that the Supreme 
Court of Illinois would not do so if the change were instantiated solely 
by legislative action.245  The Pension Protection Clause, like other 
limiting features of state constitutions, is intended as limitations on state 
legislative behavior.246 
However, the Court may not be quite as resistant to changes adopted 
through a state constitutional amendment, as such amendments must 
survive a more extensive and demanding political process than ordinary 
legislation.  The Supreme Court of Illinois might reasonably find that 
while the protection conferred by the Pension Protection Clause was 
meant to bind the state legislature, and protect state employees against 
mere legislative changes, it was not designed to impede the freedom of 
constitutional drafters or to hold employees harmless against changes 
effectuated through constitutional mandates.  The existence of 
mechanisms for amending the Illinois Constitution—and thus repealing 
 
245. In theory, federal courts reviewing federal constitutional challenges “look to state law to 
determine the existence of a contract, [but] federal rather than state law controls as to whether 
state or local statutes or ordinances create contractual rights protected by the Contracts Clause.”  
San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 737 (9th Cir. 
2009).  As a practical matter, however, federal courts follow state court decisions on the second 
issue as well.  See Monahan, supra note 77, at 1045 (“My research, however, identified no federal 
cases where a federal court ruled in direct opposition to a state court’s finding that a contract 
existed under federal law.”). 
246. While the federal constitution is a “document of grant”—a document that authorizes the 
exercise of limited governmental powers—states are deemed to have “plenary” governmental 
powers, limited only by specific constraints found in their state constitutions or the federal 
constitution.  LYNN A. BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES & 
MATERIALS 254–55 (5th ed. 2015) (“Our court regards the language in the constitution as a 
limitation upon the legislature’s authority, not as a grant of power.  Based on that view, our court 
has held that the General Assembly is free to enact any legislation that the constitution does not 
expressly prohibit.” (citing City of Chi. v. Holland, 795 N.E.2d 240, 246 (Ill. 2003) (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
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or revising the Pension Protection Clause—could be read as providing 
an implicit authorization for changing state employee pension plans 
mid-stream when authorized by a constitutional amendment and only by 
a constitutional amendment.  Instead of being a complete bar to such 
changes, the Pension Protection Clause could be interpreted as 
providing a (heavy) procedural bar to such changes.  Once the State 
manages to overcome the procedural bar attendant on constitutional 
amendments, it would be able to amend the terms of its pension plans 
pursuant to this reservation without violating the terms of the original 
pension contracts.  Courts have routinely upheld governments against 
Contracts and Takings Clause challenges to mid-career pension 
revisions when either the terms of the plan or the underlying legislation 
implicitly or explicitly allowed for such revisions, reasoning that such 
revisions did not violate the underlying pension contract.247 
There is no particular reason to believe that the Supreme Court of 
Illinois would so interpret the Pension Protection Clause, however.248  
If it does not, and instead interprets the Pension Protection Clause as 
protecting current employees’ pension benefits earned with respect to 
as-yet-to be performed services under a unilateral contract theory—a 
unilateral contract which does not include an allowance for 
Constitutional changes—the state would find itself subject to liability in 
a breach of contract suit, if not suits brought under the federal Contracts 
or Takings Clauses.  The result, once again, would be complete 
protection of current employees’ ability to continue to accrue pension 
benefits under pre-existing law. 
Contracts Clause jurisprudence protects against “substantial 
impairments” of contractual obligations unless those impairments are 
justified by a significant and legitimate public purpose.249  There is little 
doubt that the changes described above would adversely impact at least 
some current employees.  Even a revenue-neutral move from the current 
 
247. See Madiar, supra note 237, at 187–91 (describing differential interpretations of pension 
contracts in Colorado, Minnesota, and New Hampshire); infra note 260 and accompanying text 
(listing cases). 
248. The Supreme Court of Illinois’ opinion in Kanerva v. Weems, 13 N.E.3d 1228 (Ill. 2014), 
does not suggest it will be particularly amenable to any argument that would have the effect of 
lowering benefits provided to current workers or retirees.  In the one case in which a court 
confronted the question of the legality of a state constitutional amendment reducing pension 
benefits, the Supreme Court of Oregon struck the amendment down as a violation of the 
Contracts Clause without any discussion of a possible distinction between statutory and 
constitutional amendment mechanisms.  Or. State Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Oregon, 918 P.2d 765 
(Or. 1996). 
249. Monahan, supra note 77, at 1041.  Or, to put the same test another way, the Contracts 
Clause protects against any “substantial impairment” of contractual rights. 
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pension arrangement to one involving a combination of social security 
coverage and a defined contribution plan would inevitably hurt some 
current employees.  In particular, long-time workers close to retirement 
age would lose the large benefit accruals that would come to them under 
the terms of their current pension plans, which employ backloaded 
benefits formulas;250 neither social security nor most defined 
contribution benefit formulas would be similarly backloaded.251  
Although relatively young employees and short-term employees could 
come out ahead as a result of such changes,252 it is unclear whether the 
gains to some employees would offset the losses caused to other 
employees for purposes of determining whether employees’ contractual 
rights were “substantially impaired.”253  The argument becomes even 
less tenable should pension reform include, as Illinois state legislators 
desire, a significant overall reduction in pension benefits.254 
Nor is Illinois’ argument that its substantial impairment is 
“reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose”255 
particularly strong.  The United States Supreme Court has made clear 
that states’ attempts to impair their own financial obligations should be 
disfavored, stating: 
 
250. A backloaded benefit formula is one in which pension benefits, viewed in terms of 
actuarial value, do not accrue ratably over the course of an employee’s career, but instead rise in 
value over the service value.  For example, the actuarial value of benefits earned in the first year 
an employee works for an employer may amount to five percent of her cash salary, while the 
benefits earned by an employee in the last year of a thirty-year career may amount to twelve 
percent of her cash salary for the year.  See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy, 
19 VA. TAX REV. 683, 688 (2000) (defining backloading and explaining its causes); Laurence J. 
Kotlikoff & David A. Wise, Pension Backloading, Wage Taxes, and Work Disincentives 50 
(Nat’l Bureau Econ. Of Research, Working Paper No. 2463, 1987), available at http://www.nber 
.org/papers/w2463.pdf (“Most defined benefit plans are strongly backloaded . . . .”). 
251. See Julie A. Roin, The Limits of Textualism: Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 77 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1195, 1200 (2010) (“[F]inal pay plans deliver the bulk of their benefits to long-
term employees.”); Richard C. Shea et al., Age Discrimination in Cash Balance Plans: Another 
View, 19 VA. TAX REV. 763, 763–64 (2000) (making the same argument).  The loss of these 
anticipated benefits was one of the objections employees raised when private employers began 
replacing traditional defined benefit plans with cash balance or defined contribution plans—
replacements which were allowed by ERISA.  See Zelinsky, supra note 250, at 707–08 (providing 
numerical examples).  Long-term government employees would suffer similarly. 
252. See Roin, supra note 251, at 1200 (“Cash balance plans, like defined contribution plans, 
distribute their benefits more evenly among long- and short-term employees with the gains 
enjoyed by the short-term employees coming at the expense of the long-term employees . . . .”). 
253. Beermann, supra note 4, at 60. 
254. See Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that a 
one percent decrease in employee salary is a “substantial impairment” of their contract; “[i]n the 
employment context, there likely is no right both more central to the contract’s inducement and 
on the existence of which the parties more especially rely, than the right to compensation at the 
contractually specified level”). 
255. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977). 
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A governmental entity can always find a use for extra money, 
especially when taxes do not have to be raised.  If a State could reduce 
its financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend the money for 
what it regarded as an important public purpose, the Contract Clause 
would provide no protection at all. . . .  [A] State cannot refuse to meet 
its legitimate financial obligations simply because it would prefer to 
spend the money to promote the public good rather than the private 
welfare of its creditors.256 
Although Illinois faces substantial fiscal challenges, its taxpayers are 
far from the most heavily taxed in the nation.257  It faces a less 
immediate and substantial challenge than that posed by the Great 
Depression, when the Supreme Court allowed Minnesota to modify 
home-loan payment schedules to prevent foreclosures,258 nor is this 
crisis a sudden and unexpected one such as the “eleventh-hour, second 
round of cuts in state aid to the City” that the Fourth Circuit held 
justified allowing the City of Baltimore to impose a temporary, one-
percent cut in employee pay.259  More generally, governments have not 
fared well in court when claiming that their contractual impairments 
were “reasonable and necessary to effectuate an important government 
purpose.”260  When they have prevailed in cases challenging their 
 
256. Id. at 26, 29; Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Washington, 696 F.2d 692, 
701 (9th Cir. 1983), appeal dismissed, 460 U.S. 1077 (1983) (“Because the State is a contracting 
party, we give less deference to its claims of justification for impairment.” (emphasis added) 
(citing U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–26)).  Nor have other states’ attempts to use this excuse to 
justify reductions in pension obligations been particularly successful.  See, e.g., Welch v. Brown, 
551 F. App’x 804, 812 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding the issuance of a preliminary injunction against 
modifications in employee and retiree health benefits when “the record does not establish that 
bankruptcy was imminent, nor does it show that Defendants contemplated filing for 
bankruptcy. . . .  [And] the record also fails to demonstrate that Defendants considered alternative 
strategies before modifying retiree benefits”); Or. State Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Oregon, 918 
P.2d 765, 779 (Or. 1996) (“[T]he impairment is not justified by any significant and legitimate 
public purpose.”). 
257. With the temporary income tax increases, Illinois’ state and local tax burden was the 
fifteenth highest in the nation; now that they have expired, the tax burden is the twenty-eighth 
highest.  Kurt Fowler & Mike Klemens, Illinois’ Relative Tax Burden Jumps After the 2011 
Income Tax Rate Increases, TAX FACTS, Sept.–Oct. 2013, at 1, 2.  Illinois’ problem, historically, 
was that it spent like a high tax state but failed to tax like one. 
258. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).  And, of course, in that 
case Minnesota was not reducing its own financial obligations, so its legislative decisions were 
entitled to more deference. 
259. Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1020. 
260. See Welch, 551 F. App’x at 812 (upholding issuance of preliminary injunction against 
modifications in employee and retiree health benefits when “the record does not establish that 
bankruptcy was imminent, nor does it show that Defendants contemplated filing for 
bankruptcy.  . . .  [And] the record also fails to demonstrate that Defendants considered alternative 
strategies before modifying retiree benefits”); Or. State Police Officers’ Ass’n, 918 P.2d at 779 
(holding Ballot Measure 8, amending the Oregon Constitution to decrease pension rights of 
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unilateral reduction of salary or retirement or health benefits, generally 
it has been on the grounds that the terms of the underlying contracts 
allowed such reductions, or that they had no contract to begin with.261 
That said, current employees’ claim for relief under the federal 
Contracts Clause—at least if brought in federal court—will likely fail 
because they have another remedy for their loss: a state breach of 
 
public sector employees with respect to future earnings, violated the Contracts Clause of the 
United States Constitution).  But see United Auto., Aerospace, Agric. Implement Workers of Am. 
Int’l Union. v. Fortuño, 633 F.3d 37, 46–47 (1st Cir. 2011) (dismissing Contracts Clause claim 
against Puerto Rican law reducing government payroll in violation of collective bargaining 
agreements because the plaintiffs “failed to plead any factual content to undermine the credibility 
of Act No. 7’s statement that it was enacted to remedy a $3.2 billion deficit . . . [and] the 
complaint did not show how Act No. 7 was ‘[un]reasonable in light of the surrounding 
circumstances’ or ‘impose[d] a drastic impairment when an evident and more moderate course 
would serve its purposes equally well’” (quoting Mercado-Boneta v. Administración del Fondo 
de Compensación al Paciente, 125 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (second and third alteration in 
original))). 
261. For example, the impact of Oregon State Police Officers’ Association was limited 
subsequently by another case holding that the “unilateral contract” formed by state employees did 
not extend to the formulas used to determine the value of the annuities to be received by 
annuitants, allowing the state legislature to eliminate by statute certain alternative investment 
accounts for future contributions.  Strunk v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 108 P.3d 1058 (Or. 2005) (en 
banc); see Taylor v. City of Gadsden, 767 F.3d 1124, 1135 (11th Cir. 2014) (upholding the 
dismissal of a Contracts Clause claim challenging an increase in rate of employee pension 
contributions because plaintiffs “have no contractual right to a static, inviolable 6% contribution 
rate”); Me. Ass’n of Retirees v. Bd. of Trs. of the Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 758 F.3d 23, 32 (1st 
Cir. 2014) (affirming grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs on their claims that 
amendments to Maine’s public employee retirement system violated the Contract and Takings 
Clauses of the United States Constitution because “[the] Plaintiffs, regardless of whether they 
retired before or after the 1999 amendments, ha[d] no contractual entitlement to COLA benefits 
calculated under pre-2011 law”); N.J. Educ. Ass’n v. New Jersey, No. 11-5024, 2012 WL 
715284, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2012) (holding that redress sought is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment because it is retroactive in nature); Scott v. Williams, 107 So. 3d 379, 389 (Fla. 
2013) (“We again hold . . . that the preservation of rights statute was not intended to bind future 
legislatures from prospectively altering benefits for future services performed” so that “the 
actions of the Legislature have not impaired any statutorily created contract rights.”); Swanson v. 
Minnesota, No. 62-CV-10-05285 (Minn. D.C. June 29, 2011) (mem.) (dismissing contracts and 
takings clause challenges to reductions in COLA for retirement benefits because “[t]he relevant 
statutory language does not encompass a legislative contract or promise to refrain from amending 
the statutory formula,” concluding that the Legislature neither contracted to use, nor promised to 
use, the formula in effect on the date of retirement for future post-retirement adjustments to 
retirement annuities, and finding that “the challenged legislation was  reasonable and appropriate 
exercise of legislative authority and responsibility to maintain the Plans’ fiscal stability for the 
benefit of all members”); Tice v. South Dakota, No. 10-225, at 12 (S.D. Cir. Ct. 2012) (mem.) 
(“[T]he establishment of the SDRS through SDCL ch. 3-12 does not contain any language or any 
clear indication that would entitle Plaintiff to a private contractual right to a ‘forever 3.1% 
COLA.’ . . .  Plaintiff does not have a contract right to a forever COLA at the rate which was in 
effect at the time of Plaintiff’s retirement.”); Wash. Educ. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 332 P.3d 
428, 431 (Wash. 2014) (overturning order granting summary judgment to plaintiffs because “the 
legislature reserved its right to repeal a benefit in the original enactment of that benefit and the 
enactment did not impair any preexisting contractual right”). 
ROIN PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2015  1:20 PM 
2015] Planning Past Pensions 807 
contract suit.262  Several Circuits,263 including the Seventh Circuit,264 
distinguish between a “mere breach of contract . . . that leaves the 
promissee with a remedy in damages for breach of contract” and “one 
that extinguishes the remedy.”265  Only the latter creates an 
“impairment” that gives rise to Contracts Clause relief.266 
 
262. Additionally, any suit brought in a federal court may confront an Eleventh Amendment 
challenge because the remedy would require the court to order a payment of money from the state 
treasury.  Council 31 of the Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Quinn, 680 F.3d 875, 
884 (7th Cir. 2012) (denying a request for injunction under a Contracts Clause claim because “the 
injunction would force the defendants, acting in their official capacities, to extract funds from the 
State’s treasury for the ultimate benefit of the plaintiffs”); N.J. Educ. Ass’n v. New Jersey, No. 
11-5024, 2012 WL 715284, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2012) (finding that the court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over case challenging changes to state’s retirement system because 
“[u]ltimately, however, enjoining the enforcement of Chapter 78 is nothing more than an indirect 
way of forcing the State to abide by its obligations as they existed prior to the enactment of 
Chapter 78.  Therefore the relief requested by Plaintiffs is, in both substance and practical effect, 
a request for specific performance of the alleged pre-Chapter 78 contract existing between 
Plaintiffs and the State of New Jersey.  Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, such relief is 
not permitted.”). 
263. See, e.g., Taylor, 767 F.3d at 1136 (“Even assuming the existence of a contractual 
provision not to raise the employee contribution rate, plaintiffs still cannot succeed on their 
Contract Clause challenge because—at most—the City has breached a contract, not impaired 
one.”); Cherry v. Mayor & Balt. City, 762 F.3d 366 (4th Cir. 2014) (dismissing the constitutional 
challenge to the City’s reduction of cost-of-living increases in pension benefits); Council 31, 680 
F.3d at 886 (holding that a Contracts Clause action will not lie in suit for violation of collective 
bargaining contracts because “the Rules do not foreclose a remedy for breach of contract, and no 
impairment of a contractual obligation exists”); Redondo Constr. Corp. v. Izquierdo, 662 F.3d 42, 
48 (1st Cir. 2011) (dismissing a Contracts Clause claim raised by developer because “[n]o action 
of the defendants, and nothing in Law 458, prevents Redondo from obtaining a remedy for a 
demonstrated breach of the settlement agreements”); Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 
642 (4th Cir. 2011) (upholding the dismissal of a § 1983 claim because “the district court 
correctly analyzed the alleged acts of the City as establishing nothing more than a mere breach of 
contract, not rising to the level of a constitutional impairment of obligation”); TM Park Ave. 
Assocs. v. Pataki, 214 F.3d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 2000) (vacating the district court ruling on a 
Contracts Clause claim involving the breach of long-term lease between the plaintiff building 
owner and a state university when “resolution of the contract action in the New York Court of 
Claims will likely moot [the] case”); Jackson Sawmill Co. v. United States, 580 F.2d 302, 312 
(8th Cir. 1978) (rejecting a Contracts Clause claim when the holders of municipal bonds were “all 
defendants . . . open to a suit for breach of contract”). 
264. Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chi., 78 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1996) (dismissing a 
constitutional challenge to the City’s refusal to honor a development contract).  Illinois lies within 
the Seventh Circuit. 
265. Id. 
266. The Ninth and Sixth Circuits have rejected this doctrinal rule; both allow § 1983 cases 
grounded in Contract Clause claims without regard to the existence (or not) of state breach of 
contracts remedies.  E.g., Welch v. Brown, 551 F. App’x 804 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding a grant 
of preliminary injunction against an order by Flint’s Emergency Manager modifying the terms of 
health-care benefits provided under collective bargaining agreements); S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of 
Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (mem.).  Some District Courts—including one in 
the Eighth Circuit, which follows the Seventh Circuit rule—have explicitly rejected the 
requirement that no breach of contract remedy be available.  E.g., Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n of 
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Relying on Oliver Wendell Holmes’ “vivid formulation” of a contract 
as “an obligation to perform or pay damages for nonperformance,”267 
the Seventh Circuit has stated that the “essence” of a contract “is that it 
triggers a duty to pay damages for the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of . . . [a] breach.”268  When that duty is unimpaired, the 
court continued, “the obligation of the contract cannot be said to have 
been impaired.”269  The Seventh Circuit has made clear its underlying 
concern: that “[i]t would be absurd to turn every breach of contract by a 
state or municipality into a violation of the federal Constitution.”270  
Although the Seventh Circuit has not been faced with the impairment 
issue in the context of a pension claim (it has applied this doctrine in a 
case involving a breach of a collective bargaining agreement271), the 
Fourth Circuit recently rejected a Contracts Clause challenge to pension 
reductions instituted by the City of Baltimore on grounds that “the 
plaintiffs have an opportunity to litigate a breach of contract claim 
under state law.”272 
Although one commentator believes otherwise,273 it is far from clear 
that employees and retirees will be worse off by being relegated to a 
state-law breach of contract suit.  Contract damages are intended to 
place the injured parties in the same position as they would have been in 
had the contract been completed in accordance with its terms.  
Employees and retirees should, in short, walk away with as much 
money after a breach of contract suit as under a Contracts Clause suit.  
 
Omaha, Local 385 v. City of Omaha, No. 8:10CV198, 2011 WL 2293155, at *1–3 (D.C. Neb. 
June 7, 2011) (upholding an award of attorneys fees when a § 1983 claim for violation of 
Contracts Clause is alleged, disagreeing with the holding in Crosby that contract cases are not 
subject to § 1983, and following the reasoning of Higgins, Larsen, and City of Santa Ana, “absent 
a directive from the Eighth Circuit to do otherwise”). 
267. Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1251. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 1250.  This argument is reminiscent of one found in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 
1 (1944), in which the Supreme Court expressed concern about turning every “denial of a right 
conferred by state law . . .  [into] a denial of the equal protection of the laws.”  Id. at 8.  The 
majority in Snowden held that “[t]he unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute . . . 
is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of 
intentional or purposeful discrimination.”  Id.  Both decisions stem from a reluctance to involve 
federal courts in disputes (perhaps) better dealt with in state courts. 
271. Council 31 of the Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty & Mun. Emps. v. Quinn, 680 F.3d 875, 884 
(7th Cir. 2012). 
272. Cherry v. Mayor & Balt. City, 762 F.3d 366, 372 (4th Cir. 2014). 
273. Thomas McDonell, Reevaluating the Seventh Circuit’s Approach to Contract Clause 
Claims in an Age of Pension Reform, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 659, 670–71 (explaining why “[t]he 
ability of plaintiffs to bring constitutional claims rather than mere breach of contract actions” is 
important). 
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Further, a sympathetic court could order injunctive relief, and/or 
specific performance of the contract if it found (as it might) that the 
purpose of the damage remedy would be frustrated by forcing plaintiffs 
to sue after the fact for their actual losses, 274 or that the damages are 
impossible to calculate at the time of trial.275  Finally, losing access to a 
federal forum (since in the absence of a federal cause of action in the 
form of a federal constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal 
courts would have no jurisdiction), at least in the circumstances here, is 
unlikely to be prejudicial.  The Illinois state courts have an unbroken 
track record of favoring the interests of state employees in retirement 
disputes.276  Thus, there likely would be little or no difference in 
outcome should the federal Contracts and Takings Clause causes of 
action be eliminated in favor of a state breach of contracts suit. 
In sum, if Illinois employees’ pension arrangements are determined 
to be unilateral contracts, the terms of which were intended to survive 
enactment of a constitutional provision allowing the amendment of 
prospective changes in that arrangement, an attempt to impose a 
unilateral change on those arrangements, even one backed by a 
constitutional amendment, will be ineffective.  Such a result would not 
be unprecedented; a reduction of future pension benefit accruals by 
constitutional amendment (enacted by referendum) was attempted in 
Oregon and struck down by its court.277  That does not mean that such a 
 
274. Although specific-performance remedies are disfavored in contracts cases, they remain 
available.  Numerous courts have provided injunctive relief against proposed alterations in retiree 
medical coverage despite the availability of monetary damages because of the especially difficult 
financial situations of many retirees.  See Welch v. Brown, 551 F. App’x 804, 814 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(granting a preliminary injunction against alterations in medical coverage and listing cases).  The 
same arguments about the irreparability of damages caused by delay can be made in the case of 
pension benefits. 
275. Given the impossibility of determining each individual’s life span and other factors 
necessary to calculate monetary damages, plaintiffs would have a strong basis for arguing that 
determining loss at the time of trial is impracticable.  See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 
859 (2d ed. 1990) (“If the breach occurs when the contract still has many years to run, it may not 
be possible at the time of the trial to forecast loss that will result in the future. In such situations 
equitable relief has often been granted.”). 
276. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of Kanerva v. 
Weems). 
277. Or. State Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Oregon, 918 P.2d 765, 779 (Or. 1996) (holding that 
Ballot Measure 8, amending the Oregon Constitution to decrease pension rights of public sector 
employees with respect to future earnings, violated the Contracts Clause of the United States 
Constitution).  Oregon falls within the Ninth Circuit, which does not follow the “breach of 
contract” exception to the definition of “substantial impairment” for Contracts Clause purposes.  
Although the impact of this decision was limited subsequently by another case holding that the 
“unilateral contract” formed by state employees did not extend to the formulas used to determine 
the value of the annuities to be received by annuitants, allowing the state legislature by statute to 
eliminate certain alternative investment accounts for future contributions, Strunk v. Pub. Emps. 
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constitutional amendment would be useless; at the very least, it would 
prevent the Illinois government from facing the same situation in later 
years.  Moreover, it remains possible that the Illinois pension contracts 
might be interpreted to confer protection only up to the point at which 
the Pension Protection Clause was repealed. 
However, it is hard to imagine the Illinois legislature passing a 
constitutional amendment revoking the Pension Protection Clause or 
enrolling even its new employees in the social security system without 
some sort of outside pressure.  It took several years for it to cobble 
together and pass the almost certainly unconstitutional pension reform 
package, and a skeptic, or cynic, might believe some legislators were 
willing to vote for that plan only because they believed that the courts 
would strike it down. 
The federal government might be able to provide the Illinois 
legislature (and public) with an impetus for change.  If the federal 
government, operating under its Commerce Clause authority, mandated 
the immediate inclusion of all state and local government employees in 
the social security system, Illinois would be placed in the “intolerable” 
position of providing social security coverage to its employees in 
addition to the current state plan.  The combined fiscal weight would be 
unsupportable—and eminently unreasonable as many state employees 
would qualify for pensions that far exceeded their pre-retirement 
salaries.  The state government would have no alternative but to act, and 
state voters would likely follow through with an approving vote.  The 
gravity of the imposed (and not self-imposed) changes in the pension 
arrangements would also make courts more sympathetic to the state in 
any Contracts Clause challenges to offsetting pension reductions.278 
But why would the federal government agree to play this role?  Why 
might Congress expend the time and energy—and perhaps political 
capital—necessary to pass such a proposal?  Although in the short run 
adding state and local government employees to the social security 
system would increase that system’s notional revenue base, it is far 
from clear that over the long term279 the social security system would 
 
Ret. Bd., 108 P.3d 1058 (Or. 2004), the original case remains good law in Oregon and is widely 
cited. 
278. Readjustments in the pension arrangement may be regarded as “reasonable and necessary 
to serve an important public purpose” of avoiding duplicative pension coverage. 
279. In the short term, federal government outlays would be reduced as a result of the 
Windfall Elimination Provision, which reduces social security benefits for workers with pensions 
derived “from work where Social Security taxes were not taken out of your pay.”  SOC. SECURITY 
ADMIN., WINDFALL ELIMINATION PROVISION (2014), available at www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-
10045.pdf (describing the operation of this provision).  The operation of this law has a deleterious 
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enjoy a net benefit from their participation.  Moreover, some senators 
and representatives may come from states in which employees are not 
covered by social security and that would prefer to maintain wholly 
state-based systems.  Even if the legislative language were structured to 
apply only to states whose pension funding ratios fell below a certain 
percentage, a considerable amount of opposition could be expected. 
On the other hand, there may be enough concern about the financial 
implosion of Illinois and other similarly situated states to impel 
Congress to take action, particularly if Congressional members from 
those states took the lead on such legislation.  Whether they would be 
successful would depend on who, besides residents and employees of 
the state, would be hurt by the financial turmoil that is likely to result 
from continued state legislative dysfunction.  The more members of 
Congress fear (or could be made to fear) that residents of other states 
will bear the burden of this dysfunction, the more eager they will be to 
take action that might ameliorate it. 
Illinois’ fiscal woes may adversely impact residents of other states in 
a number of different ways, depending on how the crisis plays out.  If 
Illinois finds itself unable to reduce its pension obligations and lacks the 
political will to raise enough revenue to pay its accumulated (pension 
and non-pension) debts and current expenses, it may decide to conserve 
its cash by defaulting on its outstanding bonds.280  Although such an 
action will adversely affect the State, inasmuch as its government will 
be hard-pressed to borrow funds in the future, it will also impose costs 
on all the holders of existing bonds, many of whom may come from 
out-of-state.281  Further, such a default may adversely affect the cost of 
borrowing by other state and local governments because it may be taken 
“as a signal of imminent distress elsewhere.”282 
The mere threat of taking such an action may be used as leverage to 
 
effect on workers transitioning from uncovered to covered employment in mid-career, which may 
be a reason either for forcing only newly hired state and local employees into the social security 
system or for amending its terms in the event of their forced entry into the social security system. 
280. As discussed supra note 67, no court would be open to the defaulted-upon creditors, 
preventing them from obtaining an effective remedy against such an action. 
281. See Skeel, Jr., supra note 46, at 725 (“The real holders of state bonds, unlike with Greek 
debt, are wealthy individuals who hold them, either directly or through mutual or money market 
funds, because of their tax-favored status.  State bonds are especially attractive to wealthy 
individuals who live in the state of issuance . . . .”).  The political power of those wealthy 
individuals may, of course, make the default alternative less likely to occur. 
282. Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 286 (2012) (“Ideally, markets would distinguish between 
distressed and nondistressed entities; nevertheless, there appears to be substantial evidence of 
contagion that flows from distressed to healthy debtors.”). 
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obtain a federal bailout.283  The costs of such a bailout, of course, would 
be borne largely by residents of other states.284  Whether state 
politicians (and the Illinois public) would prefer a bailout to a default 
may depend on the extent and content of any strings that come attached 
to the bailout money.  The federal government can exert much more 
power over the behavior of state governments when packaged under its 
spending power than under, say, the Commerce Clause.285  It might, for 
example, tie the receipt of grant money to increases in state revenue 
obtainable only through state tax increases.286 
Whether it would impose onerous (or even reasonable) conditions is 
of course unknown.  Although there is precedent for the provision of a 
federal bailout of a fiscally distressed state like Illinois, there certainly 
is no guarantee that one will be provided.  Congress may be more 
sensitive to moral hazard concerns than it was when it provided limited 
relief to New York City in 1975; certainly, its relatively hands-off 
response to Detroit’s 2013 bankruptcy indicates that it may not be 
inclined to intervene.287  The federal government has its own fiscal 
woes, and may be disinclined to add to them, particularly if it regards 
the state government as behaving irresponsibly.  And the less the fear of 
a bailout, the less likely Congress will be to intervene at all. 
Indeed, aside from the bailout and contagion possibilities, it is 
unclear whether most states have more to fear or to benefit from 
financial turmoil in sister states.  Nearby states may hope that the 
 
283. See id. at 302 (describing how municipal defaults can “trigger demands for centralized 
intervention out of fear that an unresolved default would have contagion effects that threaten the 
stability of neighboring jurisdictions . . . or even the nation”); id. at 304–05 (“Recall that, 
notwithstanding President Gerald Ford’s much-publicized antipathy toward federal relief during 
New York City’s financial crisis in 1975, the federal government ultimately responded to the 
city’s impending filing for bankruptcy by extending loans with presidential approval in order to 
avoid the implications of default.”). 
284. The beneficiaries of such a bailout may also come from out-of-state; it would depend on 
the identity of the creditors who would be paid as a result of the bailout. 
285. Skeel, Jr., supra note 46, at 731 (“Congress has considerable scope for intervention 
before it runs up against the state sovereignty constraints . . .[r]elying on . . . financial invitation 
rather than coercion.”); see Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 
CHAP. L. REV. 195, 195–97 (2001) (“No matter how narrowly the Court might read Congress’s 
powers under the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . the states 
will be at the mercy of Congress so long as there are no meaningful limits on its spending 
power. . . .  [T]he Supreme Court . . . has historically declined to review Congress’s spending 
decisions . . . [and] crafted standing doctrine to severely restrict the ability of taxpayers to 
challenge Congress’s spending decisions in any federal court.”). 
286. Skeel, Jr., supra note 46, at 731–32 (discussing the powers that might be granted to a 
federal oversight board when coupled with “financial invitation rather than coercion”). 
287. Detroit had the option of relying on the federal courts and their interpretation of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  There is no such obvious alternative for states. 
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necessary Illinois tax increases will drive profitable businesses, not to 
mention retirees from private companies covered by social security and 
employer plans, into their jurisdictions.  Such relocations could well 
benefit other jurisdictions while leaving poorer and less mobile Illinois 
residents trapped and facing a “death spiral” of increased taxes and 
decreased services.288  Nor is it clear how many of the state’s bonds are 
held by nonresidents, another potential source of pressure in favor of 
federal relief. 
There is, of course, another alternative open to Congress.  It could, as 
some have suggested, create a bankruptcy regime for state 
governments.289  A federal bankruptcy regime might provide Illinois 
with a legal end-run around its Pension Protection Clause,290 and if 
upheld likely would allow reductions in accrued pension benefits in 
addition to those earned by current employees from the performance of 
future services.291  Although the creation of such a regime would add to 
states’ “toolkit” for dealing with financial distress,292 it would do 
nothing to protect employees who would remain totally reliant on state 
funding for their pensions;293 further, it would not necessarily require a 
 
288. Whether retirees would actually move is problematic.  See supra note 167 and 
accompanying text (discussing interstate moves). 
289. Skeel, Jr., supra note 46, at 679–80 (“Starting in late 2010, a few politicians and 
commentators insisted that state bankruptcy was an idea whose time had now come . . . .  
Advocates argued that bankruptcy would be preferable to either a complete default or a federal 
bailout.”). 
290. One of the issues raised by Detroit’s bankruptcy is whether the municipal bankruptcy 
rules take precedence over Michigan’s constitutional protections against pension reductions.  The 
city tried to finesse this question through a negotiated settlement.  One of the provisions of the 
“grand deal” (which had to be ratified by a vote of individual retirees and active vested 
pensioners to become effective) requires city employees and retirees to give up “their right to 
pursue lawsuits over pension cuts against the State of Michigan.”  Nathan Bomey & Joe Guillen, 
City Close to Pension Deal, DETROIT FREE PRESS, April 15, 2014, at 1A; Nathan Bomey, Detroit 
Forcefully Defends Bankruptcy in Filing, USA TODAY (May 27, 2015, 7:44 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/27/detroit-bankruptcy-plan-of-adjustment-d 
efense/9646417/.  Although retirees voted overwhelmingly in favor of this deal, Chad Livengood 
& David Shepardson, Detroit’s Debt-Cutting Plan Gets Big But Not Complete Support, THE 
DETROIT NEWS (July 21, 2014, 12:40 PM), http://newsinmi.com/detroits-debt-cutting-plan-gets-
big-but-not-complete-support/ (eighty-two percent of retired and active Detroit police and 
firefighters approved the plan as did seventy-three percent of members of the General Retirement 
System), it remains unclear whether the dissenters will have standing to pursue lawsuits 
challenging the pension reductions.  Michigan’s Attorney General announced that he will not 
“further litigate the issue.”  Id. 
291. Skeel, Jr., supra note 46, at 711–12. 
292. Id. at 712. 
293. It is worth noting that Illinois’ annual increase, which appears generous now, will fall 
short of protecting retirees against cost of living increases in inflationary times.  Unlike social 
security benefits, which are explicitly tied to a cost-of-living index, the Illinois increase is a 
stable, flat amount. 
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state to take future actions—such as fully funding pension obligations—
that would force them to correctly internalize the costs of their labor 
agreements on a current basis. 
It is unclear whether the Congressional delegations of burdened states 
will be eager to get Congress to take action.  They are tied to local 
political parties, and political actors, who despite the situations in which 
they currently find themselves, may be reluctant to cede further power 
to the federal government.  After all, it is not as though the transition to 
the social security system would be painless.  The contributions the 
state would have to make to the system on behalf of its employees 
would be substantial, and it is not clear that such a transition would 
decrease overall pension costs in either the short term or the long term.  
Unfortunately, while taxpayers (and perhaps state employees) benefit 
when politicians internalize the full cost of employment arrangements, 
politicians do not. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no easy, nor simple, answer to the long-foretold, but equally 
long-ignored, crisis in state pension obligations.  None of the affected 
parties will likely escape unscathed; from a financial and political 
standpoint, the only question is how the inevitable losses will be 
allocated.  However, some good might come out of this financial 
disaster.  It may provide the impetus for a rational restructuring of 
governmental pension arrangements, and more generally, for an 
intelligent discussion of the necessary linkage between the cost of 
providing government services and the need to raise revenues to defray 
that cost.  For far too long, the voting public has been willing to let 
politicians pretend that additional services can be provided at no 
additional tax cost by creatively hiding debt through stratagems such as 
underfunding pension plans and “leasing” public assets such as parking 
meter revenues and tollways. 
This Article has attempted to show some mechanisms for preventing 
the systemic underfunding of future pension obligations, and to provide 
some suggestions for equitably splitting the costs of rectifying past 
underfunding.  Unfortunately, the various dysfunctions responsible for 
the development of the crisis may forestall adoption of even these small 
measures. 
